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ABSTRACT 
After planning from September 2001 to May 2003, the George W. Bush 
administration failed to implement a coherent national plan at the transition to Stability, 
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations in Iraq. This thesis applies 
four decision-making perspectives — the rational actor, organizational process, 
bureaucratic politics, and individual level approaches — to the Phase IV planning process 
to analyze how senior decision makers within the national security system selected 
foreign policy options. Despite an experienced national security team, officials were 
unable to coordinate and integrate various agency planning efforts, failed to decide on 
specific policy objectives, and limited the consideration of multiple courses of action.  
 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE.................................................................1 
B. REAL WORLD RELEVANCE......................................................................2 
C. CONTROVERSIAL FOREIGN POLICY....................................................3 
D. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................4 
1. Single Case Study Method...................................................................5 
2. Data Sources and Data Integrity ........................................................5 
E. HYPOTHESES ................................................................................................6 
1. Primary Hypothesis .............................................................................6 
a. Cognitive Biases Î National Security Decision Making 
(NSDM) .....................................................................................6 
2. Explanatory (Intermediate) Hypotheses............................................6 
a. Cognitive Biases Î Structural Failures (IntV)Î NSDM 
Process.......................................................................................6 
b. Cognitive Biases Î Structural Failures Î Quality of 
Foreign Policy Decisions ..........................................................7 
F. ORGANIZATION ...........................................................................................7 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW: NATIONAL SECURITY  DECISION-MAKING 
PERSPECTIVES .........................................................................................................9 
A.  RATIONAL ACTOR......................................................................................9 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS ................................................................10 
C. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS.....................................................................13 
D. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL: COGNITIVE DISSONANCE .............................14 
E. DEFINING COGNITIVE BIAS CONCEPTS FOR THE CASE 
STUDY ANALYSIS.......................................................................................16 
1. Framing Trap.....................................................................................17 
2. Anchoring Trap..................................................................................18 
3. Status-Quo Trap.................................................................................18 
4. Sunk-Cost Trap..................................................................................19 
5. Confirming-Evidence Trap...............................................................19 
6. Estimating and Forecasting Traps ...................................................20 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR PHASE IV 
POLICY AND PLANS IN IRAQ .............................................................................23 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................23 
B. RATIONAL ACTOR.....................................................................................23 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS ................................................................25 
1. Leadership Functions ........................................................................25 
a. President George Bush ...........................................................26 
b. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld .................................28 
c. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice.........................29 
2. Roles and Relationships: The Future of Iraq Coalition .................30 
 viii
3. Altered Rules and Standard Operating Procedures: Ad Hoc 
Units ....................................................................................................32 
D. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS.....................................................................36 
E. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL: COGNITIVE DISSONANCE .............................41 
1. Framing Trap.....................................................................................41 
2. Anchoring Trap (Accepting the First Frame Presented) ...............46 
3. Status Quo Trap (Rationalizing First Choice as Optimal; Do 
Nothing with Alternate Choices) ......................................................48 
4. Sunk Cost Trap (Committing More Resources to a Frame 
Presented as a Loss) ...........................................................................49 
5. Confirming Evidence Trap (Seeking Out Information 
Consistent with One’s Point of View)...............................................51 
6. Estimating and Forecasting Traps (Making Estimates or 
Forecasts with Imperfect Information)............................................52 
IV. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................59 
A. DEFENDING THE HYPOTHESES............................................................59 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR ANALYZING NATIONAL SECURITY 
DECISIONS....................................................................................................59 
C. RECOMMENDATION TO NATIONAL SECURITY LEADERS 
AND PLANNERS ..........................................................................................61 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................63 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................73 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE 
This thesis uses the controversy that developed in February 2007 between the 
United States Departments of State and Defense over which agency had responsibility for 
coordinating the manning of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and executing 
Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations in Iraq, to analyze 
decisions directing policy and plans for Phase IV operations. This research applies four 
theoretical perspectives to explain the decision-making process surrounding the transition 
to Phase IV operations. The scope of this study ranges from the beginning of Phase IV 
planning in September 2001 until the transition to Phase IV in May 2003, when a formal 
plan to execute Phase IV operations would have been directed and implemented in Iraq. 
As has been widely reported since the end of major combat operations in May 2003, no 
plan was implemented for SSTR operations because “there was no real planning for post–
war Iraq.”1 
This research builds on existing literature by explaining state behavior using four 
national security decision-making paradigms:  
• the  rational actor,  
• organizational process,  
• bureaucratic politics, and 
• individual-level approaches.  
This thesis shows how cognitive biases manifest themselves into organizational 
impediments, which distort a rational decision-making process. Rationality in decision 
making implies that foreign policy objectives are based on factual information and a 
comprehensive analysis of available courses of actions, while trying to minimize or 
eliminate the irrational influences of bureaucratic politics and individual biases. The 
analysis concludes that process assumptions of rational decision making are reasonable 
                                                 
1  Jonathan S. Landay and Warren P. Strobel, "Military Unready for Iraqi Response; Welcome 
Expected, Officials Say Extensive Plans Said to be Undeveloped for Current Occupation, Security 




metrics by which to assess a rational decision-making process that is distorted by 
individual beliefs and the tendency to process information and rationalize data consistent 
with those beliefs. Analyzing decision making by applying psychological and 
organizational perspectives together — while using the concept of rational process as a 
policy metric — provides a more robust explanation of decision choices, and the quality 
of those policy options, than by viewing any one decision-making approach on its own.  
B. REAL WORLD RELEVANCE  
On 11 January 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice appointed Ambassador 
Timothy Carney to oversee U.S. reconstruction projects in Iraq.2 Specifically, Rice stated 
that “Carney will coordinate with U.S. and Iraqi leaders on reconstruction projects.”3 
Rice also testified to Congress on 11 January 2007 — the day after President Bush 
announced the new Iraq strategy — that she had been in the process of developing a 
civilian response for reconstruction teams since last year.4  
At a Senate hearing in February 2007, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates testified 
that he was unnerved by a memorandum from the State Department to the Pentagon, that 
called for the Department of Defense to man Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq 
with civilians from government departments and agencies.5 Secretary of State Rice’s 
response at the congressional hearing was that the civilian positions were “not State 
Department positions, they are positions that the State Department took the responsibility 
for organizing a civilian response.”6 Additionally, Rice stated that “positions like 
                                                 
2  Stephen Kaufman, "Rice Appoints Assistance Coordinator as Part of U.S. Iraq Plan," U.S. 
Department of State's Bureau of International Information Programs, 
http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-
english&y=2007&m=January&x=20070111130733esnamfuak0.1400873 (accessed 11 January 2007). 
3  Ibid. 
4  Congressional Testimony of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice: The New Way Forward in Iraq, 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs Cong, 2007, 
http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/ric011107.htm (accessed 24 February 2007). 
5  Michele Kelemen, "Reconstruction Teams at Premium in Iraq," National Public Radio, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=7299387 (accessed 23 February 2007). 




agronomists and engineers and city planners are not positions within the Foreign 
Service…the State Department positions have been filled.”7 The response from Gates 
indicated that Defense also was not expecting to be responsible for manning 
reconstruction teams, coordinating, and leading an interagency response for Phase IV 
operations in Iraq. In February 2007, however, Rice stated that more than 40% (129) of 
the 300 State Department positions required for the new strategy in Iraq would need to be 
filled by Defense. Rice also stated that the “agencies of the U.S. government cannot fill 
that many posts as quickly as necessary.”8  
In the confusion over agency responsibility for Phase IV — more than five years 
after contingency planning for Phase IV began — roles and responsibilities directing 
Phase IV operations continue to elude the Bush administration. Secretary Rice’s 
appointment of Ambassador Timothy Carney to the “new” position of Coordinator for 
Iraq Transitional Assistance, suggested that Rice believed this new office at State would 
finally integrate Phase IV operations with various agencies that included both civilian and 
military personnel to achieve U.S. national interests for Iraq. Those interests were 
specified in President Bush’s declaration that the end state for Iraq is not just security, 
stabilization, and reconstruction but for the country to become free and democratic.9  
C. CONTROVERSIAL FOREIGN POLICY 
President Bush declared the end of major combat operations for Operation Iraqi 
Freedom in May 2003. At this transition point, a formal plan for accomplishing Phase IV 
objectives did not exist. The academic field and research institutions emphasized the 
complicated nature of transition operations and the requirement for a comprehensive and 
coordinated strategy among government agencies during the planning period before and 
                                                 
7  Kelemen, "Reconstruction Teams at Premium in Iraq." 
8  Karen DeYoung, "Military must Fill Iraq Civilian Jobs: Rice, Pentagon at Odds Over Plan," 
Washington Post, sec. washingtonpost.com , World, Middle East, 8 February 2007, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/07/AR2007020702315.html (accessed 24 
February 2007). 
9  Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account of the Decision to Invade Iraq (New York: 




after Operation Iraqi Freedom.10 Many of these outside resources acted as advisors to the 
national security system. Career civil servants from State, Defense, and the intelligence 
community, the day-to-day planners and analysts, also were arriving at the same 
conclusions during contingency planning for Phase IV. Additionally, despite criticisms 
that there was no real planning, the fact is that considerable planning was underway for 
Phase IV at lower levels in the national security system.11 Nevertheless, President Bush 
and his national security leaders — Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the 
operational lead for Phase IV and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, the 
administrative lead for the interagency process — failed to make decisions that provided 
policy objectives and coordinated interagency planning into a comprehensive Phase IV 
plan.  
Since May 2003, various government agencies — including the Special Inspector 
General for Iraq Reconstruction and the Government Accountability Office — continue 
to emphasize the daunting task of planning for Phase IV and the absence of a coherent 
national plan for accomplishing national interests in Iraq. Headlines from February 2007 
continue to illustrate interagency confusion and ambiguous decision making that 
delineates responsibility for Phase IV policy and plans. This thesis analyzes the factors 
influencing national security decision making that explain why the Bush administration 
failed to implement a formal Phase IV plan for Iraq.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
The thesis applies theory to explain the decision-making process for Phase IV 
policy and plans in Iraq. It identifies which theoretical perspective best explains decision 
makers’ foreign policy choices and the quality of foreign policy decisions directing 
transition operations in Iraq. 
                                                 
10  Karen Guttieri, "Post-War Iraq: Prospects and Problems," Strategic Insights 2, no. 2 (20 February 
2003), http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/feb03/middleEast3.asp (accessed 24 September 2007). 
11 Donald R. Drechsler, "Reconstructing the Interagency Process After Iraq." The Journal of Strategic 
Studies 28, no. 1 (February 2005), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390500031973 (accessed 15 October 
2007). See also Kevin C. M. Benson, "OIF Phase IV: A Planner's Reply to Brigadier Aylwin-Foster," 
Military Review (March-April 2006), 




1. Single Case Study Method 
The single case study method is utilized because it allows for the observations of 
conditions within a foreign policy issue that explain the dependent variable, national 
security decisions. Because the primary hypothesis of this paper highlights the 
importance of the individual level of analysis in decision making, process tracing through 
a single case study is a valid method.12 It provides a foundation for in-depth analysis of 
decision-making behavior by observing individual statements, interviews, meetings, and 
official documents that shed light on how leaders make decisions within the national 
security system. The thesis applies decision-making perspectives to explain the selection 
of specific foreign policy options directing Phase IV plans.  
2. Data Sources and Data Integrity 
The sources of data used to investigate the decision-making process consist of 
documentation from the development of policy and plans for Phase IV from 2001–2003. 
The primary documents reviewed include agency and interagency correspondence, 
presidential directives, transcribed verbal statements, personal interviews and statements 
by leaders and other officials in the national security system.  
The personal actions of decision makers and those actors who work close to 
senior decision makers relies almost exclusively on the works of investigative reporter 
Bob Woodward in his two books, Plan of Attack and State of Denial. Woodward 
conducted personal interviews with the primary actors studied in this thesis. These actors 
included the president and members of the National Security Council, as well as deputy 
and under secretaries of departments. Where direct interviews were not conducted, 
personal accounts of individual actions within the national security system were based on 
credible and corroborating sources.13 Woodward not only had access to senior decision 
makers, but also to processes such as discussions during National Security Council 
meetings, as well as informal meetings between actors in the national security system. 
                                                 
12  Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1997), 52. 




Additionally, data used for the analysis also relied heavily on decision-making events for 
Phase IV captured in Fiasco by Thomas Ricks, COBRA II by Michael Gordon, Losing 
Iraq by David Phillips, and Rise of the Vulcans by James Mann. 
E. HYPOTHESES 
Independent Variable (IV)ÎIntervening Variable (IntV)ÎDependent Variable (DV) 
1. Primary Hypothesis 
a. Cognitive Biases Î National Security Decision Making (NSDM) 
Cognitive biases, specifically excessive consistency seeking, explain how 
and why decision makers select foreign policy options. 
2. Explanatory (Intermediate) Hypotheses 
a. Cognitive Biases Î Structural Failures (IntV)Î NSDM Process 
Cognitive biases cause structural failures within organizations, which 
influence how decision makers select foreign policy options. Leadership function is the 
most important structural feature of the organizational process. It defines individual and 
unit roles and relationships within the national security system and affects the standard 
rules and operating procedures of the decision-making process.  
The processing of information between various organizations and 
individual actors and the communication of information within the interagency process 
are the foundation for making decisions and formulating policy and plans.14 Cognitive 
biases and its influence on organizational behavior and process variables explain biases in 
decision making and rational foreign policy. 
                                                 
14  Burton M. Sapin, "Some Fundamental Characteristics of the System" In The Making of United 




b. Cognitive Biases Î Structural Failures Î Quality of Foreign 
Policy Decisions 
The stronger the presence of cognitive biases in the decision-making 
process, the greater the disruption to the structural features of organizations, and the less 
likely that foreign policy decisions are rational courses of action. 
F. ORGANIZATION 
The introduction chapter identifies the purpose of this research, reviews the 
foreign policy issue analyzed by this study, Phase IV policy and plans for Iraq, discusses 
the method of observing the empirical data, and states the hypotheses that the analysis 
will defend.  
The literature review discusses the four decision-making perspectives. The 
application of theoretical perspectives to decision making is the core of this analysis. The 
review explains how individuals make decisions that shape foreign policy and plans. 
The case study analysis chapter applies the decision-making perspectives to the 
planning process for Phase IV from 2001 to 2003, when operations transitioned from 
major combat operations to Phase IV and the establishment of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority in May 2003. Interviews, communications between individuals involved in the 
decision-making process, and data that documents leaders’ and other national security 
officials’ statements are significant for the analysis because this data provides insights 
into factors that influenced leaders’ decisions. 
The conclusion defends the hypotheses, states implications for analyzing foreign 








II. LITERATURE REVIEW: NATIONAL SECURITY  
DECISION-MAKING PERSPECTIVES 
A.  RATIONAL ACTOR 
The rational actor paradigm has been described as the theory with the greatest 
utility in explaining state decisions across a broad range of empirical cases.15 Foreign 
policy choices are the consequence of government organizations and individuals 
behaving rationally because the preservation of national interests is at stake. Although not 
synonymous with realism, the rational actor model incorporates general assumptions and 
propositions from realist theory. Realists make significant assumptions regarding the 
behavior of individual decision makers and the international system.  
The theory assumes that state behavior is quite predictable if decision makers 
view the national interest in terms of a state’s power relative to other states.16 If a state is 
more powerful than others, it seeks to maintain that status or defend it when threatened. 
Weaker states seek to balance power inequities by becoming strong enough to challenge 
the power of other states. An anarchic (ungoverned) international system is what 
determines state behavior, and foreign policy decisions are made in response to problems 
or threats in the international system.  
Another assumption, which gives the theory its explanatory power and parsimony, 
is that decision makers will behave rationally when the security of the nation is stake. 
Why? Because national security is so vital that it cannot be trivialized by internal 
pressures from within the state. The theory suggests that the decision-making process will 
not react to bureaucratic imperatives; organizations and individual perceptions are not 
biased because state self-preservation and not self-interest determine foreign policy 
                                                 
15  Glenn P. Hastedt, "Models of Policy Making: Overview" In American Foreign Policy: Past, 
Present, and Future, Third ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1997), 235. See also Allison, Essence of 
Decision, 13. 
16  Hans J. Morgenthau, "A Realist Theory of International Politics" In Politics Among Nations: The 
Struggle for Power and Peace Brief Edition, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-




decisions.17 It is the necessity to preserve the national interest (power) that forces 
institutions and individuals within the state to behave rationally. 
Rational actor theory makes further assumptions to support the proposition that 
leaders select courses of action based on information certainty. Assuming factual 
information as the basis for formulating policy, the state makes a rational choice that is 
value maximizing.18 Graham Allison posits that states select courses of action where the 
likelihood of achieving “goals and objectives” for a given policy option rank high.19 
Decision makers “think and act in terms of power, which brings rational order to 
international politics.”20 Power is used by the state to impose its will or to defend itself, 
and it is from this proposition that foreign policy decisions are made. 
Because of the constant challenges to sovereignty, leaders have no choice but to 
formulate the most optimal (rational) foreign policy to preserve the national interest; they 
must be able to bypass or overcome the political and individual biases that affect decision 
making. If individual biases and organization agendas affected decision making, a state 
runs the risk of not sustaining its relative power and position in the international system. 
Decisions made by state leaders should represent a comprehensive, unified, and optimal 
response of the decision-making (interagency) process.  
B. ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS 
In this model, foreign policy decisions are not based on the most optimal solution 
to achieve national interests. Instead, they are based on the most optimal outcome for the 
organization. Structural features of organizations are the variables that explain decision 
making and resultant organizational options to address policy issues. These features 
consist of rules, standard operating procedures, roles, and organizational relationships. 
                                                 
17  Amy B. Zegart, "Introduction" In Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 4. 
18  Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis" In American Foreign 
Policy: Theoretical Essays, ed. G. John Ikenberry (New York: Harper Collins, 1989), 338. 
19  Ibid., 339. 




Standard operating procedures, for example, explain whether decisions are made in a 
hierarchical or flat organizational system. Standard operating procedures also explain 
how routine processes such as information processing and communications influence 
decision making. Allison states that rules and “parochial priorities such as group 
pressures and the tenure of individuals,” also impact the decision-making process.21  
The most important structural feature of organizations is authority and control, 
conceptualized as leadership functions, which influence organization roles and 
relationships. It is human action that affects changes to all other structural features 
influencing the decision-making process.22 Leaders hold the power to make and influence 
decisions through their control over the subordinates that produce policy options from 
within the unit.23 Organizations are social systems, with defined rules of behavior and 
relationships predicated on one’s position in the organization and its environment.  The 
national security system is one example of a social system. Leaders, particularly in 
hierarchical and centralized decision-making systems, affect the behavior of 
organizations and decision outputs because of the strong role of positional authority over 
units and individuals. There is a pecking order of who reports to whom, who gives 
direction, and who takes direction.24 The career civil servants who are subordinate to 
their politically appointed leaders play an important role because of their indirect 
connection to the president through their unit leader and their ability to produce decision 
outputs that can directly impact presidential decisions.25 
The organizational perspective also places importance on analyzing the functions 
of process variables, information processing and communication, which are structural 
                                                 
21  Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis" In American Foreign Policy: 
Theoretical Essays, 346-347. 
22  Charles Perrow, "Perspectives on Organizations" In Organizational Analysis: A Sociological View 
(Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1970), 5. 
23  Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton M. Sapin, eds., Foreign Policy Decision-Making (New 
York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), 88-89, 222. 
24  Charles Perrow, "Why Bureaucracy?" In Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, eds. Albert J. 
Reiss and Harold L. Wilensky (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1972), 32. 




features of organizations and units (interagency) within a system that impact decision 
making.26 These structural features show how disruptions to the decision-making process 
influence the availability and quality of data required to make foreign policy decisions. 
For example, in the weeks prior to President Kennedy’s blockade decision during the 
Cuban Missile Crisis, the “September estimate” by the Central Intelligence Agency 
believed that Soviets would not place missiles inside Cuba, despite the fact that 
intelligence from the agency’s own sources indicated missiles had already been delivered 
to Cuba.27 Intelligence processing errors, and the failure to communicate inaccurate 
intelligence assessments weeks earlier, could have altered the administration’s policy. 
When correct intelligence assessments materialized weeks later, the administration’s 
decision to blockade was based in part on the assessment that missiles were already 
stationed in Cuba. The role of the Central Intelligence Agency in the Cuban Missile 
Crisis is an example of both an organization’s output and process variables influencing 
the decision-making process. 
The organizational perspective also explains how various applications of 
leadership functions change the decision-making dynamic. The traditional approach 
views foreign policy decisions as organizational outputs requiring presidential action. 
The president may delegate decisional authority to subordinate leaders, however, 
empowering them to make foreign policy decisions that address national interests. 
Organization leaders, by virtue of their role or title, may also command considerable 
influence on the decision-making process so that foreign policy decisions have already 
been made by an organization’s leader instead of as a policy option influencing the 
president’s decision.28 Whether it is a unit output requiring presidential decisions or 
delegated authority and control to a unit, organizations and the decision makers that lead 
them, not the state, are the decisional units.29  
                                                 
26  Sapin, Some Fundamental Characteristics of the System, 18. 
27  Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis" In American Foreign Policy: 
Theoretical Essays, 353. 
28  Ibid., 346. 




C. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS 
According to this perspective, it is unrealistic to believe that the formulation of 
foreign policy and national security decisions occur without the influence of 
bureaucracies and individual agendas. Peter Gourevitch states that decisions are derived 
from ideas, and for an idea to win approval it must “acquire power.”30 The process by 
which an idea wins approval in the form of a decision and course of action entails a 
competition against other agendas. Ideas are influenced by both human and resource 
constraints, and it is these various forms of power that are captured under the concept of 
the bureaucratic politics paradigm. For example, Gourevitch states that bureaucratic 
competition requires “the support of various power rivals: money (budgets), arms, or 
institutions.”31 Institutions and individuals compete to perpetuate organization or group 
ideas that result in decisions favoring political goals.  
Graham Allison and Morton Halperin characterize decision making in 
bureaucracies as the “pulling and hauling” that occurs between various power brokers as 
the struggle to have agendas (ideas) acquire political power; it is the power required to 
win presidential approval for a course of action over other choices.32 Unlike the rational 
actor model, decisions and courses of action are not rational choices that are agreed on by 
decision makers and influenced by purposeful behavior between states. Allison and 
Halperin argue that foreign policy is and can be influenced by threats from the 
international system, but national security decisions are influenced by differences, not 
rational choices, between “domestic, organizational, and personal interests.”33 
Bureaucratic politics and foreign policy outcomes are interdependent. 
                                                 
30  Peter Gourevitch, "Interacting Variables: September 11 and the Role of Ideas and Domestic 
Politics," Dialogue IO 1, no. 1 (January 2006), 
http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FDIO%2FDIO1_01%2FS7777777702000067a.pdf&c
ode=cb7f2448493b4cc0d69390f92ddf4fcd (accessed 2 February 2007), 7. 
31  Ibid., 7. 
32 Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and some Policy 
Implications," World Politics, Supplement: Theory and Policy in International Relations 24 (Spring 1972), 
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0043-8871%28197221%2924%3C40%3ABPAPAS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6 
(accessed 22 March 2007), 43. 




In the bureaucratic politics perspective, positional power plays a significant role 
in how agendas get carried out as presidential decisions. For example, the Secretary of 
Defense, in general, wields more power than the Secretary of State. This is not to say that 
individuals with positional power can monopolize the decision-making process. No one 
individual can always win, and bureaucratic politics is a give-and-take process, where 
decisions are based on compromise, relinquishing certain aspects of one’s own personal 
position to achieve buy-in and approval from the larger group (bureaucracy) involved in 
the formulation of policy and decision making.34 Individuals do have their own ideas of 
foreign policy outcomes, but achieving a decision requires building consensus and 
negotiating comprises that result in a bargaining outcome. The process is neither an 
individual nor a unitary action. Gourevitch states that “majorities have to be built, 
coalitions constructed, and legitimating arguments developed.”35 Decision making in the 
bureaucratic politics paradigm, is a political or government action, not an individual 
action.  
D. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL: COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 
Robert Jervis states that “it is impossible to explain crucial foreign policy 
decisions without reference to policy makers’ beliefs about the world and the motives of 
the actors in it.”36 An individual level of analysis approach to national decision making 
explains how state leaders use beliefs and images from their past and the present-day 
environment to make future decisions. The study of decision making through cognitive 
psychology explains how the use of cognitive shortcuts distorts a rational decision-
making process. Alexander George states that individuals develop, over time, “beliefs, 
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images, and social constructs about their physical and social environment.”37 Individuals 
display a natural tendency to frame decisions based on data that resonates with one’s 
environment. The potential consequence is marginalizing factual information, impeding 
the consideration of rational policy objectives. The reliance by individuals on personal 
belief systems and images of their environment is the tendency of the mind to make order 
out of new information, consistent with known beliefs.38 As a result, personal beliefs can 
affect the quality of foreign policy when they dominate the policy process by limiting the 
consideration of multiple courses of action.  
This natural process is termed cognitive consistency seeking.39 The brain is a 
consistency-seeking device that strives to formulate decisions that do not deviate from or 
contradict internal beliefs and perceptions of one’s environment. Decision makers 
simplify incoming data by using established beliefs to frame decision choices. Beliefs 
and images influencing decision making can be based on one’s moral or ideological 
beliefs. Decision makers may also use historical analogies based on events that 
personally affected them or which support and frame current beliefs to counter new 
information that challenges their existing views.40 This subjective bias is dangerous 
because individuals have a tendency to ignore new or unfamiliar information in the 
formulation of policy if that information does not meet the familiarity criteria of the 
decision makers’ personal image of the world; that is, on what they know and what they 
have seen.41  
Cognitive psychology identifies the biases in decision making based on over-
reliance of belief systems and familiar images, excessive consistency striving. 
Consistency seeking becomes dangerous in decision making when it is excessive, 
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resulting in an illogical interpretation of information.42 A serious consequence of 
excessive consistency striving is the strong tendency to misdiagnose the policy issue that 
needs to be addressed. The potential for introducing error or bias into the decision-
making process also can explain the low quality of certain foreign policy decisions. 
Subjective images and beliefs can inject themselves into policy formation and prevent 
rational decisions. Consistency seeking need not be viewed as negatively impacting 
decision making and the quality of policy choices, as long as its use remains logical and 
policy makers are cognizant of the tendencies to rationalize data into a policy prescription 
that makes sense to an individual’s view of the world. The implications of cognitive 
influences on the quality of foreign policy are significant. Misperceptions of one’s 
environment and the tendency of the mind to filter and simplify new data to pre-existing 
historical or personal images, can lead to poor decisions that fail to address the foreign 
policy issue.43 Awareness of cognitive traps are crucial to ensuring that excessive 
consistency striving does not take over the decision-making process. 
E. DEFINING COGNITIVE BIAS CONCEPTS FOR THE CASE STUDY 
ANALYSIS 
Consistency seeking occurs as a normal thought process in decision making. The 
mind naturally seeks to sabotage complicated decision processes by simplifying the 
interpretation of imperfect and unfamiliar information, especially when under stress or 
operating in a crisis mode.44 Leaders, through awareness, can control the tendency of the 
mind to inject biases and limit its excessiveness in impeding objective decision making. 
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Alexander George provides a number of criteria that, when one or more of these 
principles is identified, excessive consistency striving is considered to be distorting 
decision making from a rational process.45 
• when the beliefs preserved thereby are not well-grounded to begin 
with 
• when the individual relies upon inappropriate beliefs or irrelevant 
rationalizations in order to ward off incoming information 
• when the assimilation of the new information into preexisting 
beliefs involves violations of generally accepted rules for treating 
evidence 
• when the individual fails to notice events of obvious importance 
that contradict his beliefs or theories 
• when the individual displays an unwillingness to look for evidence 
that is readily available, which would pose challenges to existing 
policy beliefs 
• when the individual refuses to address the arguments of those who 
disagree with his interpretation of events 
• when he repeatedly shifts rationales on behalf of his policy in 
response to new facts 
 
The following cognitive traps identify excessive consistency striving. These 
concepts are a means of categorizing Alexander George’s criteria for detecting the 
presence of excessive consistency striving, which is hypothesized as explaining decisions 
for Phase IV policy and plans in Iraq. 
1. Framing Trap   
The most dangerous cognitive distortion is the framing trap, because of its ability 
to compound excessive consistency striving errors by simultaneously introducing other 
cognitive traps into the decision-making process. When presented with courses of actions 
that have equal outcomes, decision makers display a tendency to be risk averse when the 
                                                 





decision choice is framed as a gain, and risk seeking when the decision choice is framed 
as a loss. John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, and Howard Raiffa state that the framing trap 
confirms that decision makers “tend to adopt the frame as it is presented to them rather 
then restating the problem in their own way.”46 This psychological trap often leads to the 
emergence of a number of other traps such as anchoring, status quo, sunk cost, and 
confirming evidence. 
2. Anchoring Trap 
Hammond and his colleagues state “when considering a decision, the mind gives 
disproportionate weight to the first information it receives.”47 This trap biases 
information processing and decisions in many ways. Individuals who have routine or 
privileged access to the president, more so than other decision makers, can steer the 
president’s decision choices in a certain direction by pre-empting a policy option before 
the consideration of alternate courses of action from other leaders. Other anchoring 
mediums can take the form of a forecast read in a newspaper related to a decision issue 
where, for example, numerical ranges lead to a pre-conceived notion that limits decision 
options around the stated forecast. Anchoring traps also take the form of stereotypes 
about individuals that bias a decision maker’s view.48 The use of historical anchors is the 
tendency to forego rigorous data analysis by referring to previous solutions as a base to 
address current issues.  
3. Status-Quo Trap  
The tendency of individuals to label decision choices as rational without realizing, 
as Hammond et al., state, that the mind has invoked “a strong bias toward alternatives 
that perpetuate the status quo.”49  The primary reason for falling into this trap stems from 
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a subconscious defense mechanism to avoid responsibility and the potential for 
accountability. That is, making a decision involves action, allowing critics to find fault 
with the decision or, in the case where the decision choice is poor, to hold the decision 
maker accountable. When presented with multiple policy options, the decision maker is 
even more inclined to resort to the status quo of do nothing. That is, to stick with the 
original decision that supports the original frame instead of having to consider alternate 
options that further complicate the decision-making process or that conflict with existing 
beliefs.   
4. Sunk-Cost Trap  
This trap results in the tendency of decision makers to devote more effort, for 
example, monetary, manpower, and other resources, to a course of action to rationalize 
one’s choice selection as rational, even when the decision is a poor choice or no longer 
relevant to the issue at hand. This is yet another attempt to protect one’s ego; Hammond 
and his co-authors state that individuals are “unwilling, consciously or not, to admit to a 
mistake.”50 The sunk-cost trap is more pronounced in the public sector. It is one thing to 
admit poor decisions in private, but in government, decisions are open for scrutiny by 
numerous critics such as Congress, partisan politics, media, public, academic and 
research institutions, think tanks, and international observers. 
5. Confirming-Evidence Trap  
Hammond et al., state “this bias leads us to seek out information that supports our 
existing instinct or point of view while avoiding information that contradicts it.”51 This 
cognitive distortion is powerful because decisions are based on analyzing information; it 
strengthens familiar frames by seeking out data or rationalizing ambiguous information 
consistent with known beliefs. According to Hammond and his colleagues, there are two 
forces working against rational decision making that are caused by consistency striving.  
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First, the mind decides “what we want to do before we figure out why we 
want to do it. Second, it is our inclination to be more engaged by things 
we like than by things we dislike.” The trap determines “where we go to 
collect evidence but also how we interpret the evidence we do receive, 
leading us to give too much weight to supporting information and too little 
to conflicting information.”52 
If a decision maker is not aware of this natural tendency, the interpretation of information 
objectively and resultant foreign policy decisions become easily biased. The tendency to 
make poor foreign policy choices is greatly enhanced by this trap’s presence in the 
decision process when factual information becomes marginalized to information 
supporting one’s beliefs or frame of reference. 
6. Estimating and Forecasting Traps  
Estimating and forecasting traps have a particularly strong tendency to influence 
and impede the decision-making process when confronted with uncertainty. There are 
three common forecasting traps that attempt to resolve uncertainty and imperfect 
information: overconfidence, prudence, and recallability traps. When forecasting or 
making estimates as to future outcomes that are uncertain, overconfident decision makers 
set a narrow range of possible courses of action or assign narrow high and low value 
ranges to forecasted results because of overconfidence in one’s ability to predict 
outcomes. The prudent forecaster thinks exactly the opposite. These decision makers, 
according to Hammond et al., over estimate “just to be safe” or conduct “a worst-case 
analysis” that involves significant costs with little benefit to have a decision not achieve a 
specific course of action.53  The recallability bias causes decision makers to frame 
estimates or forecasts on what a course of action can accomplish based on past events, 
either historical precedent or even past events that are “dramatic…those that leave a 
strong impression on our memory.”54  
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The recallability trap can take the form of historical analogies. It is one form of 
heuristics or rules of thumbs (cognitive shortcuts). The mind invokes this heuristic to 
simplify forecasting or estimating future courses of action. Historical rules of thumb can 
eliminate the requirement for rigorous analysis of imperfect information and uncertainty 
in outcomes by applying past foreign policy decisions to future decision options. There 
are dangerous consequences of allowing the recallability bias to dominate decision 
making. The new foreign policy issue may be a completely different situation than the 
historical analogy. Because a comprehensive process of analyzing data and the current 
foreign policy issue is abandoned for a heuristic, policymakers do not realize the 
differences between past and current issues. Second, the historical prescription applied 
may have been the wrong course of action in the first place, convoluting the current 
foreign policy analysis even further with the inaccurate belief that the historical rule of 
thumb and its application to present courses of action are analogous. Historical analogies 
characteristic of the recallability trap ignore statistical probabilities.55 That is, forecasts 
and estimates that might assist decision makers in value-maximizing decisions supplant 
cost/benefit analysis for impressions. 
                                                 








III. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR 
PHASE IV POLICY AND PLANS IN IRAQ 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In January 2001, President Bush went to great lengths to revamp his decision-
making process for national security affairs. This was a deliberate attempt to address the 
organization of the national security system as it related to the formulation and execution 
of foreign policy. The goal of the National Security Council (NSC) transformation was to 
make the security council and Principals Committee the central decision-making 
authority for ensuring interagency cooperation. Despite restructuring decisional units, 
procedures, and defining agency roles, by 2003, departmental relations were considered 
the worst in twenty years.56 Analysis of the decision-making process for Phase IV policy 
and plans during this time period explains how national security leaders failed to produce 
a formal Phase IV plan for Iraq. 
B. RATIONAL ACTOR 
It is difficult to explain the decision-making process of the Bush administration 
using the rational actor model. That is, the security of the United States was assessed by 
decision makers to be threatened by Iraq and that resulted in the rational foreign policy 
decision to use force to remove the Saddam Hussein regime. To explain a rational 
process of deciding on foreign policy objectives for Phase IV in Iraq, one has to view this 
phase in the context of the decision to invade Iraq — a decision based on perceived 
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threats in the international system. In this sense, rational actor explanations resulted in the 
requirement to plan for Phase IV as a consequence of the decision to conduct regime 
change.  
Regime change through the use of military force, however, was not in the national 
interest of the United States because Iraq was a weaker state that had not threatened the 
power or security of the United States. President Bush believed that the security and 
national interests of the state were challenged by the regime of Saddam Hussein and 
terrorists that he supported. Nevertheless, realists were unable to make the case for 
rational foreign policy decisions action against a weak state like Iraq on the basis of Iraq 
being connected to non-state actors (terrorists).57 It was not in the national interest of the 
United States, in rational terms of value maximizing (long-term costs vs. benefits) to 
make a free and democratic Iraq a national objective.  
Even though Phase IV decisions could not be explained by the paradigm’s focus 
on decision making based on threats in the international system, it could be analyzed in 
the context of assumed rational behavior of state leaders. Policy decisions for the Phase 
IV end state in Iraq were not made by rational decision makers. The national end state for 
Iraq as a result of removing the Saddam regime was based on moralistic and ideological 
decisions: Bush administration officials believed that a free and democratic Iraq would be 
the inevitable result of U.S. action. Additionally, President Bush believed it was his duty 
to save Iraqis and other states from brutal regimes and terrorists.58 The rational actor 
paradigm does not advocate decision making based on moralistic, ideological, and 
legalistic beliefs.59  
Assumptions of the rational actor make it difficult to explain state decisions below 
the international system of analysis. This thesis explains decisions surrounding a foreign 
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policy issue as a consequence of the decision to conduct regime change. Foreign policy 
issues for Phase IV were the by-products of a response to perceived threats in the 
international system, the former Iraqi regime. It is illogical to argue that foreign policy 
decisions for nation building in Iraq were a response to power imbalances or a threat to 
U.S. security after the Iraqi regime was removed from power. The rational actor 
perspective contributes little to explaining decisions surrounding policy and plans for 
Phase IV in accomplishing the national interest. It requires analysis within the black box 
of the state. Bush administration foreign policy making highlights many of the 
weaknesses of the rational actor model, especially its inability to explain more than how 
states respond to each other’s behavior. 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS 
1. Leadership Functions 
President Bush’s first directive, National Security Presidential Directive 1, 
Organization of the National Security Council System, outlined decision making as “a 
process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development 
and implementation of national security policies.”60 The Council and Principals 
Committee, which crafted the presidential directive, were unable to execute the tenets of 
their own decision-making process. The decision makers responsible for Phase IV policy 
and plans, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Under Secretary of Defense 
Douglas Feith, did not believe in a specific Phase IV plan because they believed 
transition operations were too dynamic to allow identifying specific policy objectives in 
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Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, had 
not decided on a policy for accomplishing key Phase IV stability, security, and 
reconstruction functions.61 
a. President George Bush 
The failure of leadership explained how leaders were unable to coordinate 
organizational and interagency outputs into a formal Phase IV plan. Decision makers 
failed to combine basic leadership functions — such as deliberating on the feasibility of 
specific policy options, deciding on policy options, and directing policy decisions —to 
create an integrated plan to accomplish Phase IV objectives. The absence of analyzing 
intended consequences of decisions and courses of actions was reflective not only in 
President Bush’s decision-making style, but was representative of the leadership style of 
national security decision makers. Although Bush was a decisive President, as Bob 
Woodward stated, 
the new factor was the absence of doubt at the top. Bush displayed no 
hesitation or uncertainty. It might be prudent to overrule an earlier 
decision, step back, and debate the merits, but Bush was not that way.62 
the president listens but does not push back or drill down into the details. 
He displays considerable “uncertainty of fully grasping the potential 
consequences” of policy options.63  
Former Secretary of Treasurer Paul O’Neill, who attended NSC meetings, stated that the 
president 
“does not make decisions in a methodical way; there is no free-flow of 
ideas or open debate.” At cabinet meetings, the president is “like a blind 
man in a room full of deaf people. There is no discernible connection, 
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forcing top officials to act on little more than hunches about what the 
president might think.”64 
 
Characteristic of his hands-off leadership style and confidence in his senior 
decision makers, when it came to making decisions on specific policy objectives for 
Phase IV, President Bush delegated decisions to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 
who he formally put in charge of leading Phase IV by January 2003.65 However, 
Rumsfeld had assumed control of the decision-making process, marginalizing Rice and 
her role by September 2002.66 What became problematic for President Bush over the 
course of a year-and-a-half of planning was that, with his hands-off leadership style, he 
became a disengaged leader. He was not holding any of his appointees to account for 
failing to produce a national Phase IV plan and failing to address or resolve what was 
recognized by most national security leaders as a distorted decision-making process.67 
President Bush was not completely removed from making presidential decisions 
involving Phase IV. By January 2003, Bush indicated that the United States would not 
install an Iraqi regime.68 By March 2003, he clearly made the decision that an exiled Iraqi 
leader, for example Ahmed Chalabi, was not going to be the governing authority post–
Saddam.69 These types of presidential decisions did rule out a specific course of action 
for Phase IV, but senior decision makers were not carrying decisions to its logical end 
state. No one took the president’s decision on governance that resulted in ambiguity and 
asked the follow-on questions. For example, the president was not going to install Iraqi 
diaspora to lead government post–Saddam, so what were the other governance options 
requiring a decision? 
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What typified decision making under President Bush’s leadership during National 
Security Council meetings was the absence of in depth communication that resolved clear 
planning gaps. In December 2001, the military commander responsible for operations in 
Iraq, General Tommy Franks, briefed the president and the security council on the 
limitations of the military leading Phase IV operations.  As Franks stated, “the military 
did not do nation building very well.”70 Franks also briefed key assumptions that the 
State Department would establish a provisional government. On 15 August 2002, Franks 
reiterated the support role of the military in Phase IV as well as the briefed assumptions 
of the State Department. Eight months after the original briefing, no decisions had been 
reached as to who would be responsible for leading Phase IV or deciding on specific 
policy objectives. For example, who would govern Iraq after regime change?71 
b. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
In decision-making moments, Rumsfeld, as operational lead for Phase IV, 
did not make major policy and planning decisions. On key policy objectives requiring a 
decision, Rumsfeld asked his subordinate, Jay Garner, what his (Garner’s) policy for 
governance was, despite the fact that, organizationally, Garner and the Office of 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance received policy direction from Rumsfeld 
and Feith. In March 2003, Garner realized war was approaching and continued to direct 
the governance question at Rumsfeld. As Woodward noted, “Who was going to be in 
charge?” 
At one point Rumsfeld had asked Garner a key question in a Rumsfeldian 
way. “By the way, what are you going to do about de-Baathification? Do 
you have a de-Baathification process? “You can’t do de-Baathification of 
the ministries,” Garner replied. “There won’t be anybody left. Most of the 
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guy. We’ll let everyone else return and over time people in the ministry 
will begin to point out the bad guys.” “Well that seems reasonable to me,” 
Rumsfeld replied.72 
After eighteen months of planning, in March 2003, Rumsfeld and Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith, were still briefing the president and 
security council on assumptions for Phase IV. What was missing from meetings were 
identified objectives and a plan to accomplish Phase IV end state. Woodward stated that 
the meeting “was a wish list of high hopes with no how-to.”73 On 10 March 2003, after a 
National Security Council meeting, President Bush ruled out a course of action to install 
exiled Iraqis, specifically, Ahmed Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress. Despite the 
presidential decision, when Garner briefed Feith the day after, noting that Chalabi would 
not have a role as a leader of post–Saddam Iraq, he was reprimanded by Deputy Secretary 
of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Feith for “creating problems and ruining everything.”74 
They had ignored the president’s decision from the day before. Typical of senior leaders’ 
failures to address planning gaps for Phase IV, after the president ruled out a specific 
course of action, Rumsfeld and Feith failed to address alternate policy options with 
Garner. Without any direction from Feith and Rumsfeld, who created the Office of 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, or from Rice as the president’s policy 
advisor, Garner set out to come up with the best Phase IV plan. Like other lower level 
agency planners, he was acting without decisions on policy objectives from the national 
leadership. 
c. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice 
National Security Advisor Rice’s failure to execute her leadership 
responsibilities also explained how leaders made decisions for Phase IV. She had been 
absent from fulfilling her role of communicating policy, coordinating interagency 
planning, and overseeing the decision-making process since the start of contingency 
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planning. When Garner briefed Rice on Phase IV planning before the start of Operation 
Iraqi Freedom, Garner stated that he had received “no funding for basics such as food, 
law enforcement, and energy.” Rice told her assistant, Stephen Hadley, and her executive 
steering group director, Frank Miller, to “get going on this,” two weeks before the start of 
OIF.75 When Garner asked Rice for the president’s policy on Iraqi governance, Rice did 
not have an answer for him.76 The absence of detailed discussion regarding national 
policy, and follow through on planning gaps, exemplified decision making even when 
these issues were communicated to the president and the security council by lower-level 
decision makers such as Jay Garner.  
2. Roles and Relationships: The Future of Iraq Coalition  
Although leadership errors explained the absence of decision making for Phase 
IV, the offices of the Secretary of Defense and Vice President were not interested in 
making decisions through the interagency because leaders within these two offices had 
already established their own policy objectives for Phase IV. A powerful coalition, 
labeled The Future of Iraq Coalition for identification purposes in this thesis, was an ad 
hoc decisional unit, established in September 2001, that began to significantly distort the 
decision-making process for Phase IV. The most senior group members, Richard Cheney, 
Ahmed Chalabi, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and I. Scooter Libby, 
had strong relational ties and a common foreign policy doctrine that had been established 
over the previous decade.77 The members of this Future of Iraq Coalition included Vice 
President Richard Cheney, Iraqi National Congress leader, Ahmed Chalabi, Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Defense Policy 
Board Advisory Committee Chairman, Richard Perle, Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy Douglas Feith, Chief of Staff and NSA for the Vice President, I. Lewis Scooter 
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Libby, Under Secretary of Defense and lead for the Office of Special Plans, William Luti, 
Director of Operations for Special Plans, Abram Shulsky, Special Assistant to Rumsfeld, 
Steve Herbits, Chief Pentagon spokesman, Larry Di Rita. 
Loyalty to the president was a strong attribute of the Future of Iraq Coalition, and 
it was used to advance its overall agenda and to dominate decisions. The concept of 
loyalty was an organizational norm that emerged during Phase IV planning, altering 
established roles, relationships, and decisional power. Under the Bush administration, the 
price of loyalty eliminated contrary views normally associated with a healthy vetting 
process and significantly disrupted standard operating procedures and rules for decision 
making. Individuals who presented courses of action and opinions contrary to the 
majority consensus were labeled as unsupportive of the president and marginalized from 
the decision-making process.78 Although Rumsfeld was quite removed from making 
national decisions directing policy and a formal Phase IV plan, he and Vice President 
Cheney were heavily involved in making decisions that removed primarily State 
Department officials from the policy process. The conclusion that Cheney and Rumsfeld 
drew from dissenting views and courses of action contrary to that of the coalition was 
that these personnel, as Woodward stated, were not committed to postwar planning and 
“not supporters of change . . . There were too many at State, Powell included, who were 
neither sympathetic nor supportive of the President’s goal of democracy in Iraq.”79  
The coalition’s decisional authority was empowered by its independence from 
operating as a formal organization. Coalition members operated officially in the capacity 
of their assigned organization, as in, for example, the Offices of the Vice President and 
Secretary of Defense. However, the members of the coalition used their formal leadership 
positions and colluded together as a decisional unit to perpetuate their common agenda 
for Phase IV. This decision was made at the expense of ignoring the planning outputs of 
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their formal unit, primarily within the Department of Defense.80 The coalition presented 
the appearance of a broad-based consensus among the majority of senior decision makers 
as to Phase IV policy and plans.  
3. Altered Rules and Standard Operating Procedures: Ad Hoc Units 
Historically, ad hoc units have emerged within national security decision making 
to address foreign policy issues. Under the Bush administration, the creation of ad hoc 
units became an impediment to the decision-making process. National security leaders, 
primarily Rice and the principals, failed to prevent the Future of Iraq Coalition from 
limiting policy options and courses of action characteristic of decision making that was 
defined by the council’s own directive. Additional units redefined roles and relationships, 
rules, and standard operating procedures within the national security system and assigned 
additional decisional powers (authority and control) that negatively impacted the 
development of a national plan for Phase IV.  For example, the establishment of the 
Office of Special Plans by Rumsfeld and Cheney, the assignment of Rumsfeld’s Policy 
office as the lead Phase IV decisional unit headed by Feith, and enabling Ahmed Chalabi 
and the Iraqi National Congress as an intelligence source influencing Phase IV policy 
objectives, strengthened the coalition’s control over Phase IV policy.  
In January 2001, Cheney had propositioned President Bush to make him the chair 
of the Principals Committee, giving him considerable influence over the decision-making 
process. The National Security Advisor had traditionally been the chair of this most 
senior decisional unit. Although Bush kept Rice as the Principals’ Chair, he granted 
Cheney permission to attend all of the meetings. In the context of Cheney’s influence and 
power within the Bush administration, privileged access to the president, positional 
power as vice president, and the special relationships that he maintained with the Future 
of Iraq Coalition, the non-traditional and frequent presence of the vice president in the 
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decision-making process disrupted the objective consideration of alternate viewpoints.81 
Cheney created his own national security council and advisor within the Office of the 
Vice President. David Phillips stated that Cheney’s office, “functions like an independent 
body in the national security decision-making process, wielding enormous influence.”82 
The elimination of individuals, such as those from State, from the planning process was 
one such example of influence.  
After 11 September 2001, the administration’s anti-terrorism chief, Richard 
Clarke, sent a report to the White House stating that intelligence assessments were unable 
to link Iraq to the September 2001 terrorist attacks. The report was vetted through and 
signed by various intelligence agencies. National Security Advisor Rice and her assistant 
Stephen Hadley sent the report back, as Richard Clarke stated, with the comment “wrong 
answer.”83 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld subsequently set up his own information 
processing unit within the Office of Special Plans to hedge against the established 
intelligence community’s assessments on Iraq.84 The Office of Special Plans was 
authorized by Rumsfeld after 11 September 2001, as the primary source for processing 
information that supported the coalition’s options for regime change and post–Saddam 
Iraq. Because Special Plans dealt with the interpretation of information, it explained how 
coalition members subverted agency outputs from State and the intelligence community 
in favor of one policy option: that Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress were the 
solution to accomplishing Phase IV end state. Seymour Hersh stated 
Ahmed Chalabi, an Iraqi exiled opposition leader and his party the Iraqi 
National Congress (INC), became a favorite candidate of the Defense 
Department to lead Iraq after regime change. Chalabi and the INC 
provided Special Plans with alternate sources of information that 
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established Saddam Hussein as a threat to the United States as well as an 
intelligence source regarding the conditions to expect in Iraq after regime 
change. The relationships between Cheney’s and Rumsfeld’s office and 
the INC strengthened its position over intelligence disputes with the CIA 
and gave the Secretary of Defense’s office leverage over both the CIA and 
the Department of State in deciding on policy and courses of action for the 
future of Iraq. Special Plans became a conduit for intelligence reports from 
the INC to officials in the White House.85 
 Rumsfeld set up numerous decisional units overseeing Phase IV policy and plans 
but was himself indecisive over whether he wanted to lead Phase IV and asked 
subordinate leaders such as Garner for policy decisions. Although U.S. Central Command 
planners began developing concepts for Phase IV in February 2002, the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense ordered Central Command to leave Phase IV planning to the State 
Department.86 In May 2002, Rumsfeld ordered planning for Phase IV operations through 
his Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.87 By August 2002, Rumsfeld controlled both the 
decision-making process, the responsibility of Rice, as well as policy decisions directing 
Phase IV plans.88 In September 2002, Rumsfeld and Feith agreed that the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense for Policy, Feith’s office, would lead all aspects of Phase IV. 
Woodward stated that 
Rumsfeld wanted reconstruction and political issues worked out in 
advance because, as Rumsfeld said, “we do not want to be in a position 
where the failure of somebody to do those things ties our forces down 
indefinitely the way they seemed to be tied down in Bosnia indefinitely.” 
Rumsfeld stated that Feith would be in charge and as a specific goal: 
“unity of effort and unity of leadership for the full range of reconstruction 
activities that need to be performed.”89 
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The September 2002 meeting was a key decisional event impacting Phase IV plans. 
During this meeting, General Franks and his operations director, Major General Victor 
Renuart, were present and took away significant assumptions from the meeting with none 
of the four leaders clarifying assignment of responsibilities for Phase IV. After the 
discussion over responsibility for Phase IV 
Major General Victor Renuart commented to Franks, “boss, did you hear 
what I think I heard?” “What do you think you heard?” Franks inquired. 
Well, Renuart said, “it sounds to me that OSD Policy (Feith) has 
responsibility for planning post-conflict and our responsibility is security. 
And we don’t own the reconstruction stuff.” “That’s the way I see it too,” 
Franks said. “I just think we dodged a big bullet,” Renuart said. “Well, 
you may be right,” Franks said. “I’ve got my marching orders. The 
secretary wants us to focus on security.”90 
In January 2003, Feith convinced Assistant National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley to 
set up an additional decisional unit for Phase IV planning under Feith’s Policy office. 
Rumsfeld and the White House agreed on the concept, established the Office of 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance headed by Jay Garner, and assigned 
planning and implementation authority for Phase IV to Garner’s office.91 
 Rumsfeld’s indecisiveness over national policy for Phase IV precluded 
him from integrating a formal Phase IV plan among various agencies. This 
paralysis was most notable within his own organization as he was unaware of the 
various levels of planning occurring within the Defense Department. Rumsfeld’s 
solution was to direct his new head of Phase IV operations, Jay Garner — who 
had less than eight weeks to develop a Phase IV plan — to provide leadership to 
his own organization and the interagency in making decisions that materialized as 
a coherent Phase IV plan. Rumsfeld stated to Garner in January 2003 
“regardless of what you have been told, there’s been an awful lot of 
planning throughout the government for this.” But that it had all been done 
in the “vertical stovepipe” of each of the federal agencies, including the 
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Defense Department. “I recommend that you try to horizontally connect 
the plans and find out what the problems are and to work those problems 
and anything else you find.”92 
Rumsfeld’s office, Feith’s policy shop, the Office of Special Plans, the Office of 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, United States Central Command, and the 
Office of the Joints Chiefs were units that existed within Defense. The senior leaders 
within Defense were incapable of making decisions that integrated plans within their own 
organization, let alone the planning options produced by other agencies for Phase IV. 
The organizational process perspective offers an explanation of the organizational 
structural features impeding decisions on specific policy objectives. Leadership failures 
and the establishment of ad hoc units such as the Future of Iraq Coalition explained 
decision making that prevented the development and implementation of a coherent 
formal plan for Phase IV. However, it did not explain why a very senior and experienced 
national security team acted in a manner that was counterproductive to ensuring the 
execution of a rational decision-making process that they created. Although the 
perspective concluded that the coalition had a defined policy for Iraq — when faced with 
information certainty that supported more optimal alternate courses of action than the 
coalition’s agenda — senior leaders such as President Bush and National Security 
Advisor Condoleezza Rice were incapable of steering the decision-making process away 
from the dominance of the coalition to an organizational process that made decisions 
based on integrated agency outputs.  
D. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS 
Two competing agendas emerged on how to proceed with Phase IV operations. 
One side consisted of the Future of Iraq Coalition, a mix of senior leaders primarily 
belonging to the Offices of the Secretary of Defense and Vice President. The competing 
agenda was in the State Department, in particular with Secretary of State Colin Powell 
and Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. The Central Intelligence Agency and 
                                                 




State shared similar assessments on certain courses of action, agreeing, for example, that 
Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress should not hold any leadership position in post–
Saddam governance. Although the compatibility of agendas between the Central 
Intelligence Agency and State for Phase IV was not completely clear, in general, a 
bifurcated agenda existed between Central Intelligence Agency staffers and its director, 
George Tenet, who sided more with the president’s or the coalition’s agenda.93 As a 
result, Central Intelligence Agency intelligence assessments that might otherwise have 
gained power as a consensus output to influence presidential decisions were marginalized 
by the politicized agenda of the Central Intelligence Agency director and the coalition. As 
a data source for developing policy options, the marginalization of the Central 
Intelligence Agency and State was exacerbated by the creation of the Office of Special 
Plans, which strengthened the coalition consensus because it was controlled by majority 
decision makers with the power to influence. This was a level of power unattainable by 
Secretary of State Colin Powell and the Central Intelligence Agency without bureaucratic 
power (Tenet).94 
At first glance, it is reasonable to view the Future of Iraq Coalition versus State as 
the two competing agendas seeking to build a consensus strong enough to win a 
presidential decision. However, when applying the bureaucratic perspective to Phase IV 
options, it is difficult to argue that that the coalition had to acquire power for its ideas and 
agenda. The coalition that came to dominate Phase IV decision making existed as an 
informal group of individuals over the past decade prior to 2001.95 Because the coalition 
consisted of members of the National Security Council, Principals and Deputies 
Committees, Office of the Vice President, and Office of the Secretary of Defense, it did 
not have to, using Peter Gourevitch’s concepts,  “acquire power” to compete with other 
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agendas, nor did it need or seek the “support of various power rivals.”96 The coalition 
began contingency planning for Phase IV with absolute power, consisting of the most 
senior leaders within the national security system with the authority to control decision 
outcomes.  
Leadership or positional power also played an important role in the bureaucratic 
politics paradigm because of the leaders’ ability to influence the formation and selection 
of agendas into a consensus. The paradigm states, however, that individuals cannot 
perpetuate their own agendas without bureaucratic buy-in. Agenda seekers have to 
negotiate compromises to build a majority consensus that can win over the president in 
selecting proposed options. The pulling and hauling required to achieve compromise and 
buy-in from other power brokers to form a larger consensus was absent in Phase IV 
planning because the coalition had absolute decisional power: presidential power 
delegated to Cheney and Rumsfeld for Phase IV policy and plans. The coalition did not 
have to consider negotiating compromises. In fact, the pulling and hauling for Phase IV 
characteristic of decision making in bureaucratic politics became dysfunctional infighting 
under the Bush administration. Cheney and Rumsfeld’s Future of Iraq Coalition 
eliminated Powell, the State Department, and others from the decision-making process.97 
 The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Joint Chiefs asked 
Colonel Paul Hughes, head of national security studies at the National Defense 
University, to lead a conference in November 2002 on Phase IV requirements. Hughes, 
who became a staff member on the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian 
Assistance, proposed an interagency and international plan for Phase IV. Woodward 
stated that Feith’s policy office at Defense responded with a “simple no to an interagency 
plan because National Security Presidential Directive 24 put authority and responsibility 
for postwar planning with the Defense Department.”98 Even though Rumsfeld’s office 
initiated the conference, the coalition’s mission superseded their own organization’s 
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agenda and effectively eliminated policy options that compromised the coalition agenda. 
There was no bargaining process to achieve a majority consensus that was characteristic 
of bureaucratic politics. 
 The actions of Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Feith are examples of what makes 
explaining decision making through the bureaucratic politics’ perspective difficult. 
Decision making and planning for Phase IV became neither a governmental action nor 
the pulling and hauling characteristic of the bargaining game necessary to build a 
consensus to sway presidential decisions in favor of a policy option. President Bush was 
removed from the decision-making process, and by delegating presidential power to 
Rumsfeld, he delegated it to the coalition, who did not make decisions directing policy 
and plans for Phase IV. By April 2003, after the fall of the Saddam regime, key Phase IV 
issues such as political and economic policy had not been formally decided on by the 
president, the NSC, or the coalition.99  
 When assistant National Security Advisor Hadley forced the Deputies Committee 
to sit down, in April 2003, to generate the organization of the Iraqi government with a 
U.S. special envoy in charge, Feith and his deputy, Under Secretary of Defense William 
Luti left the meeting. Woodward stated that  
Steve Hadley called a deputies committee meeting to come up with the 
final organization chart. He indicated the president was antsy, and said he 
was going to keep them locked in the Situation Room until they finished. 
Feith and his deputy, Luti, got up to leave. “You heard what Steve said, 
Frank Miller interjected, “We’re going to sit here and work.” “We will try 
and send someone back,” Luti replied and left but no one came back from 
the Pentagon.100  
When Rumsfeld saw the organization chart the next day at a Principals meeting, 
Woodward stated that 
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Rumsfeld came in swinging. “This isn’t an interagency product,” he said. 
“My people weren’t involved.” “Mr. Secretary, Miller said, “Hadley said 
to do it. Your people left and said they might send somebody back. There 
was no other option. Your people left the game.” Rumsfeld didn’t respond, 
but the charts and diagrams were only so much abstraction. Under the 
President’s directive, NSPD 24, he was in charge.101 
These were the bureaucratic attributes of the coalition. If one did not like alternate policy 
options, coalition members left the policy process, blamed the interagency (Deputies 
Committee), or when in error of making accusations, Rumsfeld reminded himself that the 
bargaining process no longer applied because he maintained the power to control 
decisions. Pulling and hauling was best described as significant infighting, not 
characteristic of cooperating and bargaining to achieve consensus.  
 Although the coalition marginalized competing agendas, it was not able to sell 
key policy options to the president. President Bush ruled out the coalition’s plan to 
prevent Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi from governing Iraq. It is difficult to apply President 
Bush’s actions or that of the coalition to the bureaucratic politics model for the reasons 
that the consensus power was unable to co-opt the president into a policy decision, nor 
was the Future of Iraq Coalition’s agenda representative of a bargaining process between 
agencies.  
In the case of Phase IV planning under the Bush administration, bureaucratic 
politics did not explain how policy options won presidential approval as decisions that 
represented a consensus group’s agenda. The president, as senior decision maker, was 
almost completely removed from the decision-making process for Phase IV.102 As a 
result, President Bush did not behave according to an important tenet of the paradigm, as 
a president involved in the game of competing interests, which must build consensus 
through negotiating agendas to obtain a presidential decision. The Future of Iraq 
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Coalition did not require presidential decisions because President Bush delegated foreign 
policy decision making to subordinate leaders, as in the case of Rumsfeld.  
E. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL: COGNITIVE DISSONANCE  
The organizational perspective explained, through the failure of structural 
features, how decision makers were unable to implement a Phase IV plan. It did not, 
however, answer an important question: Why did a very senior and experienced national 
security decision-making team, the National Security Council and Principals, behave in a 
manner that distorted a rational decision-making process? The individual level of analysis 
offers explanations of why, through excessive consistency striving, cognitive biases 
negatively influenced the decision-making process. Although consistency seeking is a 
natural cognitive process, its excessive presence in decision making led to biased policy 
and plans for Phase IV, as Alexander George stated, by “narrowing or distorting the 
processing and appraisal of information about a situation.”103  
1. Framing Trap 
The decision-making process for post–Saddam policy and plans was framed by 
three major themes. First, over a decade-long relationship between the most senior 
members of the Future of Iraq Coalition — specifically, Richard Cheney, Ahmed 
Chalabi, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and I. Scooter Libby — 
framed the initial policy approach advocating regime change and the assumption that 
installing Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress would solve major Phase IV issues: 
political stability, security, and reconstruction.104 This belief not only became an 
assumption, under Chalabi and his political party, it grew to become considered the most 
reliable information source by the coalition over the U.S. intelligence community, despite 
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corroborating assessments that Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress’ informant 
network had not been considered a reliable source for over ten years.105  
Second, Phase IV decisions and policy were excessively influenced by idealistic 
and moralistic beliefs of senior decision makers. On a macro level, the national end state 
for Iraq, freedom and democracy, was based on the specific foreign policy philosophy 
perpetuated not only by the Future of Iraq Coalition but embraced also by President Bush 
and National Security Advisor Rice. President Bush and Rice were interim leaders who 
embraced the belief systems of the senior members of the coalition who held long-
standing moral and idealistic beliefs for the U.S. role in the international system: freedom 
and democracy were necessary at any price regardless of the consequence. As James 
Mann stated, “the liberal ideals of freedom and democracy would eventually take root in 
Iraq and the Middle East, albeit not easily.”106 The “not easily” part, the part that 
involved Phase IV, the nation-building mission, became too myopic a concept for the 
Bush administration who viewed their moral and ideological beliefs of the world as the 
big picture end state. What happened to democracy in between regime change was trivial 
when it achieved the broader goal of spreading democracy and freedom in Iraq and the 
Middle East.  
These moral and ideological beliefs were based on faulty historical anchors. As 
Mann stated, “other countries who did not appear ready for democracy really were, they 
just needed to be given the chance.”107 The simplistic nature of this ideology translated 
into the simplistic approach to Phase IV planning. This characterization of senior 
coalition leaders, as well as President Bush and Rice, on their macro foreign policy 
beliefs, as Mann stated, was an “extraordinary optimistic (and simplistic) assessment of 
American capabilities and influence” in Iraq, the Middle East, and the international 
system, which took root within the policy process of the national security system and 
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prevented sound policy decisions.108 That is, planning for, committing resources to, and 
forecasting costs for nation building (Phase IV) were not to become obstacles to 
accomplishing macro foreign policy objectives. Interagency planners and non-
government advisors indicated that planning for Phase IV would not be simple. Rather, it 
would be a daunting task, as cost estimates and forecasts of conditions for a post–Saddam 
Iraq materialized. When moral and ideological beliefs of the administration became 
challenged, individuals who offered opposing views were marginalized or removed from 
the decision-making process by the decisional power of the Future of Iraq Coalition.  
On specific Phase IV policy objectives for achieving freedom and democracy in 
Iraq, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy, Douglas Feith, both acknowledged that their Iraq policy was shaped by historical 
precedent and personal tragedies. Both of their families were affected by the Holocaust 
and both felt the appeasement of Hitler was bad policy and that in the postwar phase for 
WWII, de-Nazification was a policy that could be applied to Iraq and de-
Baathification.109 Additionally, Ahmed Chalabi strengthened the frame by backing the 
policy for the primary reason that it provided him and the Iraqi National Congress, an 
avenue to insert themselves into power post–Saddam. Wolfowitz, although primarily the 
most influential leader in making the case for regime change, minimalized any challenges 
to Phase IV planning by framing expected conditions for nation building based on the 
reconstruction of Europe in WWII. Trudy Rubin stated that the administration’s view was 
that “postwar Iraq would resemble post–World War II France and Chalabi and the INC 
would come back and establish a democracy; the likelihood of postwar instability was 
virtually nil.”110  
At first glance, it was not problematic to frame policy based on historical 
precedent. The problem with applying the WW II reconstruction and the de-Nazification 
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analogy to Iraq was that the comparisons were not analogous. The Central Intelligence 
Agency, United States Agency for International Development, the State Department, 
outside advisors such as the Army War College, National Defense University et al., 
assessed throughout Phase IV planning that ethnic, regional, religious, and other rivalries 
in Iraq would be a major obstacle to sovereignty and security.111 The makeup of Iraq was 
quite different from the homogenous societies of France, Germany, and Japan, as well as 
the established institutions of these countries. Yet de-Baathification, which became a 
policy decision for Phase IV by May 2003, was based on the historical policy of de-
Nazification during WWII. De-Baathification in Iraq became the complete disbanding of 
the longest-established institutions in Iraq — the civil service and Iraqi army — by the 
Coalition Provisional Authority.  
The de-Baathification order of Iraq ministries and the military also did not follow 
the historical precedent on which it was based. James Fallows noted that de-Nazification 
was executed without “dismantling the bureaucracy or excluding everyone who held a 
position of responsibility.”112 What emerged was a policy based on moral and ideological 
principle. Baathists were likened to Nazis in the sense of suppressing and cleansing 
ethnic and religious ethnicities, and it was a moral obligation of the United States to de-
Baathify Iraq. Although Feith supported de-Baathification, he did not want complete de-
Baathification initially, wanting to retain some semblance of the military for 
reconstruction.113 Complete de-Baathification, however, is what the Coalition Provisional 
Authority ordered in May 2003. The consensus opinion by military planners, academia 
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reconstruction and the follow-on wars of liberation over the past fifty years, “successful 
occupation suggested that it is best to go in real heavy (force size) and then draw down 
fast.”114  
This historical precedent, “to go in heavy for Phase IV,” ran counter to the third 
and last major frame, the Bush administration’s military transformation and nation 
building doctrine. The Bush administration had a moral obligation to stop oppressive 
regimes and those that threatened the security of the United States through pre-emptive 
action. Postwar responsibilities were primarily the responsibility of the occupied country, 
however, with U.S. assistance as required. The de-emphasis on nation building, while 
advocating preemptive action, was a belief secured by Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld prior 
to the decision for regime change, but which framed the administration’s decisions for 
Phase IV planning.115  
The conceptual philosophy and historical precedent that Phase IV required a force 
size larger than the Phase III (combat operations) force, and that Phase IV planning was 
the more difficult and daunting task than Phase III, was anathema to the Bush-Cheney-
Rumsfeld transformation doctrine of preemption without nation building.116  They 
believed that future wars could be fought with fewer resources than in previous wars of 
liberation, and they were highly skeptical of the associated risks of nation building. That 
is, the smaller the force size, the less the impact of a relatively small invasion force on 
reconstruction operations. As a result, Rumsfeld and other coalition members placed little 
emphasis on the consequences regime change had on post–Saddam Iraq.117 The Bush-
Cheney-Rumsfeld military transformation doctrine framed the approach to Phase IV, that 
future wars could be conducted with small force sizes, lessening the reconstruction 
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impact and the forward-leaping assumption that postwar responsibilities and costs could 
be assumed by and fall primarily to the occupied country, for example, Iraq.118  
2. Anchoring Trap (Accepting the First Frame Presented) 
What secured a distorted decision-making process for Phase IV were numerous 
instances of anchoring traps that closed off alternate courses of action and the 
consideration of intelligence that questioned the policy ideas of the most powerful 
decisional unit (Future of Iraq Coalition). The three frames were very compatible with 
each other and became a circular process of idea and policy validation, resulted in the 
formulation of poor foreign policy, and enabled the anchoring trap’s most powerful tenet 
even further. As Hammond et al., state, “the mind gives disproportionate weight to the 
first information it receives.”119  
Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld established the Office of Special Plans in his Policy Office headed by 
Douglas Feith. Special Plans was led by Feith’s deputy, William Luti. The office’s 
purpose was to research information on Iraq’s capabilities that the Central Intelligence 
Agency might have overlooked. Richard Perle, the Chairman of the Defense Policy 
Board Advisory Committee, a board of independent private sectors members, chosen by 
Feith and approved by Rumsfeld, brought Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the Iraqi 
National Congress, into the fold of Special Plans and Rumsfeld’s office. Chalabi and the 
Iraqi National Congress were longtime favorites of senior decision makers within the 
coalition for leading Iraq after regime change.120 The analysis previously established that 
Chalabi and his political party became an alternate source of intelligence for assessments 
on conditions to expect in Iraq after regime change. During twenty months of planning, 
Chalabi convinced the coalition that Iraqis would welcome the American presence and 
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that he and the Iraqi National Congress would establish security after regime change.121 
This conviction generated a number of assumptions that governance and security for 
Phase IV would not be problematic.  
The coalition solidified the initial frame that Chalabi and his political party would 
bring democracy and stability to Iraq. Phase IV assumptions were that government and 
security would remain intact, and the United States would, as Michael Gordon stated, 
“enable” Iraqis to take charge of their future.122 The Future of Iraq Coalition dismissed 
contrary views by Iraqi diaspora competing against Chalabi for power, and removed State 
Department planners and leaders from the policy process because they did not favor 
Chalabi as an information source or installing the exiles’ opposition leaders post–
Saddam. The decision by the coalition to remove the most qualified individuals from the 
decision-making process was the consequence of needing to keep new information and 
conflicting policy options consistent with original beliefs. The factual data and analysis 
that State, the intelligence community, and outside advisors brought to Phase IV planning 
would have complicated and challenged oversimplified assumptions of the Phase IV 
environment.  
The Bush administration’s belief that the United States was not in the nation-
building business led to powerful assumptions that validated both the transformation 
doctrine for future wars and the moral and ideological beliefs that the United States has 
an obligation to remove tyrannical regimes from power and that, once free of oppression, 
democracy would follow. Having excluded the international community from Phase IV 
planning as a general policy, and with no intention of transferring responsibility for Phase 
IV to the United Nations or non government organizations, senior decision makers 
assumed Iraqis would, as Gordon and Trainor stated, “do the work of Phase IV 
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themselves.”123 The assumptions that manifested themselves into numerous supporting 
anchors throughout the planning process explained how excessive consistency striving 
distorted the consideration of alternate courses of action; senior decision makers, 
primarily from the coalition but also from the within the White House, struggled to 
maintain their initial frames for the future of Iraq. National Security Advisor Rice 
summarized the administration’s expectations for Phase IV conditions. 
The concept was that we would defeat the army, but the institutions would 
hold, everything from ministries to police forces, you would be able to 
bring new leadership but we were going to keep the body in place.124  
3. Status Quo Trap (Rationalizing First Choice as Optimal; Do Nothing 
with Alternate Choices) 
The decision-making process for Phase IV illustrated excessive consistency 
striving by the most influential decisional authority, the Future of Iraq Coalition, and the 
Bush administration’s desire to reinforce the three major framing themes affecting policy 
and plans for Phase IV. This trap’s roots are grounded in the psychological explanation of 
the subconscious tendency to avoid responsibility and accountability. But this trap also 
secured the coalition’s future of Iraq frame, as Hammond states, by “doing nothing” with 
alternate courses of action. Where policy decisions for the future of Iraq after Saddam 
were pre-determined by existing beliefs within the three major themes, the trap also 
explained the coalition’s bias to perpetuate the status quo of its long-standing beliefs by 
marginalizing individuals and information critical to a rational process. The result was 
the failure to seriously consider opposing views and the selection of poor foreign policy 
choices. The status quo trap explained how and why initial frames were secured and the 
tendency of the mind to simplify incoming information consistent with known beliefs.  
Despite President Bush deciding that Iraqi exiles would not lead Iraq’s 
government post–Saddam in March 2003, and with Vice President Cheney capitulating to 
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the president and telling the coalition to back away from the idea that Chalabi and the 
INC would lead a provisional government, the power of the status quo trap remained 
strong. Coalition members could not relinquish themselves from the Chalabi solution for 
governance and security for all the ensuing problems that would arise: new policy, new 
plans, and the consideration of new courses of action that potentially contradicted its 
initial beliefs. By April 2003, with no clear Phase IV transition plan, Rumsfeld’s special 
assistant, Steve Herbits, in searching for a presidential envoy that would eventually lead 
the Coalition Provisional Authority, recommended Wolfowitz as the envoy because as 
Herbits wrote: 
the facts were that Wolfowitz enjoys the widest support among Iraqis, that 
being Chalabi and the INC…that the Iraqi diaspora (Chalabi) were central 
to the overall strategy.125  
This was a recommendation to the president, despite that over a month earlier, the 
president decided that Iraqi exiles were not going to be central to the overall strategy of 
leading Iraq. By early April 2003, Chalabi still remained influential and the coalition still 
wanted to place him in Iraq to take charge of governance and security issues. Despite the 
military not wanting Chalabi and the INC in the middle of combat operations, Woodward 
stated that “there was pressure to do just that,” by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense.126  
4. Sunk Cost Trap (Committing More Resources to a Frame Presented 
as a Loss) 
The  Future of Iraq Coalition members never believed that they made poor policy 
decisions. The dominant leaders of the coalition, such as Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, 
and Feith, really believed that individuals with opposing views were trying to sabotage 
rational policy and plans.127 As corroborating evidence and other consensus views 
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indicated that Phase IV planning and the post–Saddam environment would be a much 
more complicated task than originally believed, the coalition’s actions supported the traps 
proposition by devoting more and more resources to strengthen its power in the decision-
making process and to ensure that its policy for Iraq, democracy, and minimal planning 
assumptions for nation building remained intact.  
The sunk cost trap also explained the continuous devotion of resources and 
personnel to fix a poor decision-making process. This bias was specifically evident in two 
senior leaders: Rumsfeld as lead for Phase IV policy, plans, and operations, and Rice as 
administrative lead for coordination and integration of decisions within the interagency. 
Sunk cost traps materialized primarily by the creation of ad hoc decisional units and 
planning units in an attempt by Rumsfeld and Rice to get their arms around a failed 
decision-making process.  
For Rice, unable to exert leadership within the decision-making system, handed 
off her responsibilities to a security council staff director, Frank Miller, who uncovered 
soon after taking over the policy process what Rice and her assistant, Hadley, had not 
addressed in over ten months of planning: that coordinating planning within Defense was 
so disorganized, Rumsfeld was incapable of overseeing or managing an integrated Phase 
IV plan. Woodward stated that 
Miller is surprised that one of his primary jobs becomes not coordinating 
interagency plans but coordinating among the various sections of Defense. 
The Pentagon’s budget office, Feith’s policy shop, General Myer’s Joint 
Staff, and Frank’s CENTCOM are all operating independent of each other 
within Defense on Iraq plans.128 
Miller is also the chief of staff for the Deputies Committee. He notes that 
moving paper and policy decisions out of the Pentagon to the Principals 
and President is so disorganized and chaotic that Miller has to hold off-
line meetings each week with Card, Rice, Hadley, and Libby to outline 
problems and blow the whistle so that they could nudge Rumsfeld or 
others.129 
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The creation of ad hoc decisional units by Rumsfeld and Cheney significantly 
anchored the administration’s initial frames by adding spheres of control that perpetuated 
the coalition’s agenda. This was a conscious effort by the coalition to maintain authority 
and control over policy and plans. But for Rumsfeld, directing ad hoc units served an 
additional purpose. It obscured direct lines of accountability and, combined with his 
inability to make concrete decisions on specific policy objectives and plans, the sunk cost 
trap explained Rumsfeld’s desire to protect his ego from criticism for Phase IV decisions. 
The degree of indecisiveness among national leaders in directing major Phase IV policy 
decisions into a formal plan and the commitment of resources to bad choices illustrated 
an unwillingness to admit mistakes, but also supported the administration’s initial beliefs 
for the future of Iraq.  
5. Confirming Evidence Trap (Seeking Out Information Consistent with 
One’s Point of View) 
The initial framing traps introduced confirming evidence traps at the expense of 
sound foreign policy decisions during the Phase IV planning process. Confirming 
evidence traps had a powerful effect of distorting the quality of policy options that were 
based on analyzing information. The Office of Special Plans was initially set up by 
Cheney and Rumsfeld within the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy to compile 
information in making the case for regime change. However, because Rumsfeld’s Policy 
office brought in Ahmed Chalabi and his political group as an alternate intelligence 
source to make the case for war, Iraqi National Congress sources were critical in shaping 
data that assessed the postwar phase for the coalition, which believed that the Iraqi 
National Congress was running a credible informant and intelligence network within Iraq.  
Phase IV policy for Iraq was not based on a decision-making process within the 
national security system, but on Chalabi and his political party. Despite the abundance of 
criticism from within government, and outside advisors from research and academic 
institutions that forecasts for postwar conditions in Iraq were grim, especially the security 




exile stated, “greeted with flowers,” but that Chalabi would “activate his network of tens 
of thousands of Iraqis to control security post Saddam.”130 When agencies and the 
intelligence community, as well as other Iraqi diaspora, questioned the credibility of 
Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress’ intelligence and sources, they were 
marginalized from the decision-making process. Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress, 
a political unit of the Future of Iraq Coalition, paid over 36 million dollars by the United 
States from 2000-2003, were now a U.S. intelligence agency.131 The Bush administration 
was unable to make decisions based on forecasts of conditions for Phase IV because its 
containment policy of the Saddam regime over the last decade prevented the 
establishment of earnest intelligence collections inside Iraq.132  
6. Estimating and Forecasting Traps (Making Estimates or Forecasts 
with Imperfect Information) 
This thesis distinguished between the decision actions of leaders belonging to the 
Future of Iraq Coalition and those of President Bush and National Security Advisor Rice. 
As is evident in this section on the distorting effects of excessive consistency striving, the 
beliefs of both the White House (Bush and Rice) as well as the coalition, significantly 
biased the decision-making process. Feith and Rumsfeld were averse to planning because 
they did not believe in the accuracy of predictions for the Phase IV environment. Feith 
stated that 
being ready for whatever proved to be the situation in postwar Iraq. You 
will not find a single piece of paper…that says, Mr. Secretary or Mr. 
President, let us tell you what postwar Iraq is going to look like, and here 
is what we need plans for. If you tried that, you would get thrown out of 
Rumsfeld’s office so fast — if you ever went in there and said, let me tell 
you what something’s going to look like in the future, you wouldn’t get to 
your next sentence.133 
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This quote by Feith on Rumsfeld captured, in essence, how the beliefs of the lead 
(Rumsfeld) for Phase IV policy, the coalition, and that of the White House, explained the 
Bush administration’s approach to Phase IV policy and plans. As Feith stated, “being 
prepared for whatever,” became the rationale for not having to plan. It was not true, 
however, that Rumsfeld and the administration did not make predictions and forecasts as 
to the future of Iraq. Contrary to the stated philosophy on the inability to make estimates 
as the rationale for not having a specific Phase IV plan, the Bush administration fell into 
overconfidence traps and made overly optimistic forecasts about the future of Iraq, which 
influenced its policy for Phase IV. 
The intentional decision to ignore predictions had less to do with the belief that 
Phase IV was unpredictable as it had in validating the three primary frames guiding 
decisions in the Bush administration. The coalition manipulated estimates and forecasts 
in two ways. By refusing to make forecasts as to the conditions of post–Saddam Iraq, the 
administration avoided having to explain decisions that were contrary to their initial 
beliefs. This was most evident in supporting the administration’s military transformation 
doctrine. Gordon and Trainor stated that Rumsfeld “had a cow” in January 2003 over 
proposed force sizes for Iraq.134 This reaction was a response to incoming data that 
contradicted the transformation doctrine’s goal for smaller force sizes in future wars.  
9 January 2003: Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz wanted Franks to identify points 
at which the President could stop the flow of reinforcements midstream. If 
the regime collapsed quickly, units should be off-ramped.135 
25 February 2003: Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki testified to 
Congress that postwar Iraq would require a commitment of several 
hundred thousand U.S. troops.136 
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27 February 2003: Wolfowitz testified to Congress that Shinseki’s number 
was “wildly off the mark” adding, “it’s hard to conceive that it would take 
more forces to provide stability in post Saddam Iraq than it would take to 
conduct the war itself.”137 
By April 2003, military leaders and the intelligence community voiced increasing 
concern about future instability since the fall of Baghdad. Much of the concern centered 
on the notion that the force size in Iraq was too small to conduct security operations. 
Rumsfeld dismissed this assessment in his famous “freedom’s untidy” speech that the 
deteriorating security condition was a natural consequence of regime change that must 
run its course. He minimalized the focus on security conditions by painting a rosy 
forecast of what Iraq would become. Rumsfeld stated 
free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and to do bad 
things. They’re also free to live their lives and do wonderful things, and 
that’s what’s going to happen here.138 
 
Overly optimistic forecasts anchored the administration’s transformation doctrine 
in addition to validating intelligence estimates by Chalabi and the Iraqi National 
Congress, the coalition’s policy choice for post Saddam governance and security. 
 The belief by Rumsfeld, Feith, Wolfowitz, and others in the Future of Iraq 
Coalition that forecasting future conditions for unpredictable environments such 
as Phase IV were futile, eliminated the requirement to plan. As Feith portrayed in 
his characterization of Rumsfeld, and which exemplified the lengths the coalition 
went to keep incoming data consistent with its original beliefs, individuals paid a 
heavy price for trying to forecast requirements to plan for Phase IV. However, 
coalition leaders, in particular Cheney, Chalabi, and Rumsfeld, were notorious for 
manipulating information uncertainty to make overconfident forecasts that 
anchored the administration’s existing frames on Iraq and nation building in 
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general.  For example, Woodward noted that on 16 March 2003, Cheney stated on 
the television program Meet the Press that:  
regarding the pending invasion of Iraq, “my belief is we will, in fact, be 
greeted as liberators,” he predicted. The host, Tim Russert, pointed out 
that General Shinseki had testified to Congress that postwar plans in Iraq 
would likely require several hundred thousand troops. Cheney responded, 
“to suggest that we need several hundred thousand troops there after the 
military operations cease, after the conflict ends, I don’t think is accurate. 
I think that is an overstatement.”139 
When faced with imperfect information, estimating and forecasting traps became more 
pronounced, reducing the ability of leaders to make objective decisions. Cheney’s tactic, 
adopted by other coalition members, was very successful at taking information 
uncertainty and turning imperfect data into fact. The coalition perpetuated its beliefs, as 
Thomas Ricks stated “with a hard-line, dismissive, no debate stance, using certitude” to 
frame decisions, policy, and make forecasts.140  
This unique skill served three purposes. The administration used information 
uncertainty as a justification for not planning, as Fallows stated, “reflecting Rumsfeld’s 
emphasis on the unknowability of the future.”141 The administration avoided criticism 
and public oversight over costs for Phase IV by arguing that the uncertain environment of 
Phase IV made estimating costs for reconstruction impossible.142 When it came to 
anchoring the administration’s long-standing frames on Iraq, moralism and idealism, and 
the military transformation doctrine, however, the Bush administration was successful in 
using information uncertainty to make overconfident forecasts about conditions in Iraq 
and its prospects for democracy. 
                                                 
139  Woodward, State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III, 151. 
140  Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 51. 
141  Fallows, Blind into Baghdad. 




Forecasting reconstruction costs for Phase IV were noticeably absent in meetings 
with senior leaders on Phase IV planning. Consistent with what happened to contrary 
opinions and individuals whose actions threatened the administrations three guiding 
beliefs, personnel were removed from the planning process or, in extreme cases, forced to 
resign. James Fallows stated that 
In September 2002, Lawrence Lindsay, White House economic advisor, 
estimated that war in Iraq and its aftermath might end up at one to two 
percent gross domestic product, which would mean $100 billion to $200 
billion dollars. Lindsay was widely criticized by administration 
officials…his comment “made it clear Larry just didn’t get it.” By the end 
of the year Lindsay was forced to resign. No one who remained in the 
administration offered a plausible cost estimate until months after the war 
began.143 
The primary reason for disciplining personnel for making reasonable forecasts was that 
objective cost estimates to conducting Phase IV operations and the long-term obligation 
of nation building ran counter to all three of the Bush administration’s original frames for 
the future of Iraq. First, the belief that a smaller force size lessened the impact on 
reconstruction efforts and the optimistic prediction that occupied nations would bear the 
reconstruction costs for being liberated. Second, as the coalition’s figurehead for its 
vision of Iraq, Chalabi anchored the administration’s beliefs on nation building by 
estimating, along with other coalition leaders, that Iraqi oil revenues would pay for 
reconstruction costs.144 This assessment was based on overconfident forecasts that oil 
production would quickly reach pre-war levels, while underestimating the state of the 
Iraqi oil sector and the security condition in Iraq that would lead to numerous attacks on 
the oil infrastructure. Finally, the beliefs of the most ardent proponents of United States 
moral and ideological obligations, those within the Future of Iraq Coalition, minimalized 
forecasting costs for Phase IV because of the insignificance it placed on what transpired 
between regime change and the greater context of what the administration would be 
remembered for historically: the spread of democratic ideals as a strategic foreign policy 
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objective. Estimating the costs of regime change and nation building were not to become 
obstacles to accomplishing macro foreign policy objectives of freeing oppressed nations 
and spreading democracy. The Bush administration believed the United States had 
unlimited resources and power to further moral and ideological foreign policy.145 
                                                 









A. DEFENDING THE HYPOTHESES 
The individual level of analysis supported the hypothesis that an excessive 
reliance on belief systems explained decisions affecting policy and plans for Phase IV in 
Iraq. The analysis also showed how cognitive consistency impacted the quality of foreign 
policy in addressing national end-state objectives for Iraq. Explaining the decision-
making process for Phase IV was enhanced by one intervening variable that was 
influenced by cognitive biases. The effects of cognitive traps resulted in a failure of 
leadership, which distorted the normal routine of the national security decision-making 
process, resulting in the inability of leaders to implement a national Phase IV plan.  
The Bush administration adopted moralistic and ideological beliefs, maintained a 
strong relationship with Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi, and implemented a military 
transformation doctrine that framed policy and planning objectives for Phase IV. As a 
result, an important structural feature of organizations — leadership function — failed on 
three levels. First, established and formally defined leadership positions created ad hoc 
decisional units to perpetuate the agenda of the most influential decisional power, the 
Future of Iraq Coalition, headed by Vice President Richard Cheney and Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, which distorted a rational decision-making process. Second, 
President Bush and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice failed to resolve 
disruptions to the decision-making process, for example, the marginalization of alternate 
policy options that contested the coalition’s agenda. Third, the Bush administration was 
unable to implement its agenda, albeit poor foreign policy, into a coherent plan for Phase 
IV.  
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR ANALYZING NATIONAL SECURITY 
DECISIONS 
The rational actor and bureaucratic politics perspectives offer the least 




assumptions of rational actor decision making, however, offer a valuable explanation of 
what constitutes sound foreign policy formulation and is a useful metric by which to 
judge an objective policy process. Concluding that a rational decision-making process is 
impeded by individual-level explanations of decision making, for example, cognitive 
biases, emphasizes to analysts and decision makers the importance of awareness in 
understanding how psychological factors and cognitive biases effect decision making. 
Explanations drawn from an individual level of analysis combined with an organizational 
perspective offer relevant explanations of decision making within the Bush national 
security system.  
The bureaucratic politics model was insufficient at explaining decision making for 
Phase IV. Many of the salient features of bureaucratic politics, positional power, 
consensus building, and bargaining that are used to form agendas, fit within the context 
of structural features of organizations. Leadership functions, such as authority and 
control, unit roles and relationships, and unit outputs, depict the characteristics of units, 
but also explain the bureaucraticness of decisions. That is, the organizational perspective 
is capable of explaining the politics of decisions and the structural features that explain 
how individual and group agendas are formed. If one views consensus power as a 
decisional unit, it can be analyzed in the context of the organizational perspective. In this 
perspective, unit outputs may not materialize from traditional units such as Defense and 
State, but from the creation of formal and informal ad hoc (bureaucratic) units that have a 
significant impact on the decision-making process.  
Individual and group behavior in the bureaucratic politics paradigm is best 
explained through psychological and cognitive theories of decision making. For example, 
motivational analysis of human behavior and the affects of personality in decision 
making are one of many subfields of psychology and sociology that capture the process 
of bureaucratic politics.146 The importance of beliefs and images within the field of 
cognitive psychology, explain factors influencing agenda formation and group think 
within the bureaucratic politics model. Factors influencing agendas, such as belief 
                                                 




systems, are more relevant in understanding how individuals make decisions than 
analyzing the pulling and hauling of ideas to win a presidential decision, which was not 
characteristic of the Bush administration.  
Framing this paradigm as a stand-alone approach to explain decision making 
implies normative behavior. That is, it validates the proposition that empowering 
decisions and consensus or coalition politics that forces the senior decision maker’s hand 
is expected behavior in bureaucracies. Winning the argument for a course of action by 
building consensus becomes more important than validating the effectiveness of the 
agenda the consensus group seeks to advance to accomplish national interests. This focus 
on moving an idea through the bureaucracy and not fully vetting the idea was 
characteristic of Bush administration foreign policy and that of the Future of Iraq 
Coalition, which negatively effected the formulation of a coherent Phase IV plan.  
The counterargument to this thesis is that bureaucratic infighting within 
government is unavoidable. One either learns to play the game or becomes relegated to 
the sidelines. This metaphor, unfortunately, described the case for Phase IV decision 
making, where individuals with alternative policy options and dissenting views to Bush 
administration preferences were marginalized from the policy process. Although 
cutthroat politics is considered normal behavior within the national security system, 
bureaucratic infighting can produce sub-optimal outcomes. Understanding the process of 
building power for ideas (agendas) is more suitably viewed under the organizational 
perspective. For those who believe in the predictive power of the bureaucratic politics 
paradigm because of its innate presence in government decision making, need to consider 
the impact of belief systems on the practice of government decision making.147 
C. RECOMMENDATION TO NATIONAL SECURITY LEADERS AND 
PLANNERS 
This offers three recommendations. First, policymakers need to recognize that 
cognitive traps, manifested as the objective of maintaining cognitive and policy 
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consistency, can have a negative effect on the decision-making process. Second, 
awareness of the effects of belief systems on decision making provides a foundation for 
studying how foreign governments make decisions.148 Incorporating an awareness of 
cognitive biases in the formulation of foreign policy can prevent many of the assumptions 
made by states with regard to the rational behavior of their own decision makers as well 
as the dangerous assumption that foreign governments make decisions in a rational 
manner.149 
Third, leadership is required to address the introduction of cognitive biases into 
the decision-making process. It is unrealistic to expect that individual assignment to 
positions of authority and control within the national security system will be based on 
leadership experience and qualifications to perform leadership functions. The 
appointments of decision makers to lead the national security system are made at the 
discretion of the president. Given the subjective nature of political appointments, the 
most qualified individuals may not be assigned to leadership positions. This makes 
awareness of the potential distorting effects of cognitive biases in decision making a 
more daunting and necessary task. 
Individuals are the wild card in the decision-making process that impact the 
quality of foreign policy. Leaders and policy makers need to understand the implications 
of seeing the world through their own cognitive lenses and the tendency to make 
decisions that support familiar frames of reference. Decision makers require a critically 
thinking and unbiased sounding board. As a prescription, national security leaders should 
embrace a neutral observer in the decision-making process to thwart group think, 
personal agendas, and consistency-seeking biases from becoming the driving force 
behind the foreign policy formulation process.150 
                                                 
148  Chan, "Rationality, Bureaucratic Politics and Belief Systems: Explaining the Chinese Policy 
Debate 1964-1966," 333. 
149  Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, "Let Us Know Praise Great Men: Bringing the 
Statesman Back In," International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001), http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-
2889%28200121%2925%3A4%3C107%3ALUNPGM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D, 109. See also George, The 
“Operational Code,” 201. 
150  George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective use of Information and 




LIST OF REFERENCES 
Alden, Edward. "Cheney Cabal Hijacked U.S. Foreign Policy." Financial Times, 20 
October 2005, FT.com, sec. U.S./Canada.  
Allison, Graham T. "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis." In American 
Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, edited by G. John Ikenberry. New York: Harper 
Collins, 1989. 
Allison, Graham T. and Morton H. Halperin. "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and 
some Policy Implications." World Politics, Supplement: Theory and Policy in 
International Relations 24, (Spring 1972). 
Allison, Graham T. and Philip D. Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. Second ed. New York: Longman, 1999. 
Belasco, Amy. The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror 
Operations since 9/11. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2007. 
Benson, Kevin C. M. "OIF Phase IV: A Planner's Reply to Brigadier Aylwin-Foster." 
Military Review (March-April 2006). 
Betts, Richard. "The Trouble with Strategy: Bridging Policy and Operations." Joint 
Forces Quarterly No.29, (Autumn/Winter 2001/2002) 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0729.pdf (accessed 26 February 2007). 
Brodin, Katarina. "Belief Systems, Doctrines, and Foreign Policy: A Presentation of Two 
Alternative Models for the Analysis of Foreign Policy Decision-Making." 
Cooperation and Conflict 7, no. 97 (1972). 
Bush, George W. Fact Sheet: The New Way Forward in Iraq. Washington, DC: Office of 
the White House Press Secretary, 2007, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-3.html (accessed 23 
February 2007). 
———. "The White House: Appointments." The White House Presidential Personnel 
Office. http://www.whitehouse.gov/appointments/ (accessed 15 October 2007). 
———. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006, 




———. Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and 
Stabilization. Washington, DC: Office of the White House, 2005, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html (accessed 20 February 2007).  
———. National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 2005, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_strategy_nov2005.html (accessed 20 
February 2007). 
———. United States Government Operations in Iraq. Washington, DC: Office of the 
White House, 2004, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd051104.pdf (accessed 
20 February 2007). 
———. The National Security Strategy of the Unites States of America. Washington DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), 2002, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html (accessed 10 February 2007). 
———. Organization of the National Security Council System. Washington, DC: White 
House Press Office, 2001, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm (accessed 
15 February 2007). 
Byman, Daniel L. and Kenneth M. Pollack. "Let Us Know Praise Great Men: Bringing 
the Statesman Back In." International Security 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001). 
Chan, Steve. "Rationality, Bureaucratic Politics and Belief Systems: Explaining the 
Chinese Policy Debate 1964-1966." Journal of Peace Research 16, no. 4 (1979). 
Congressional Testimony of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice: The New Way Forward 
in Iraq. House Committee on Foreign Affairs Cong., 11 January 2007, 
http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/ric011107.htm (accessed 24 
February 2007). 
Crane, Conrad C. and W. Andrew Terrill. Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenge, and 
Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario. Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute of the United States Army War College, 2003. 
DeYoung, Karen. "Military must Fill Iraq Civilian Jobs: Rice, Pentagon at Odds Over 
Plan." Washington Post, 8 February 2007, online, sec. washingtonpost.com, World, 
Middle East, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-





Diamond, Larry. "In Search of a Plan." In Squandered Victory: The American 
Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq. New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 2005. 
Drechsler, Donald R. "Reconstructing the Interagency Process After Iraq." The Journal of 
Strategic Studies 28, no. 1 (February, 2005). 
England, Gordon. Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction 
(SSTR) Operations. Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005, 
http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/n324501.pdf (accessed 20 
February 2007).  
Fallows, James. Blind into Baghdad. Atlantic Monthly, January/February 2004.  
Franks, Tommy. U.S. Central Command Slide Compilation, Top Secret/Polo Step, Tab I: 
Compartmented Planning Effort, Power Point Presentation. Washington, D.C.: 
United States Central Command, 2002a. 
———. U.S. Central Command Slide Compilation, Top Secret/Polo Step, Tab K: 1003v 
Full Force Distribution, Power Point Presentation. Washington, D.C.: United States 
Central Command, 2002b. 
———. U.S. Central Command Slide Compilation, Top Secret/Polo Step, Tab L: 
Compartmented Concept, Power Point Presentation. Washington, D.C.: United 
States Central Command, 2002c. 
Friedman, Thomas. "Bad Planning." The New York Times, 25 June 2003, sec. Opinion. 
Foreign Relations United States Senate. Future of Iraq. First, 108th Congress sess., 11 
February 2003. 
Future of Iraq Project Overview. Future of Iraq Project Overview. Washington, DC: 
United States Department of State, 2002, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/FOI%20Overview.pdf 
(accessed 25 February 2007). 
George, Alexander L. Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use 
of Information and Advice. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980. 
———. "The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political 
Leaders and Decision Making." International Studies Quarterly 13, no. 2 (June, 
1969). 
Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor. Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion 




Gourevitch, Peter. "Interacting Variables: September 11 and the Role of Ideas and 
Domestic Politics." Dialogue IO 1, no. 1 (January 2006). 
———. "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics." 
International Organization 32, no. 4 (Autumn 1978), http://links.jstor.org (accessed 
27 August 2007). 
Grossman, Marc. “Online NewsHour: a NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, interview by Ray 
Suarez (11 February 2003), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-
june03/iraq_2-11.html, (accessed 15 October 2007). 
Guttieri, Karen. "Post-War Iraq: Prospects and Problems." Strategic Insights 2, no. 2 (20 
February 2003). 
Halchin, L. Elaine. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): Origin, Characteristics, 
and Institutional Authorities. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2005, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/48620.pdf (accessed 20 August 
2007).  
Hammond, John S., Ralph L. Keeney, and Howard Raiffa. "The Hidden Traps in 
Decision Making." Harvard Business Review 76, no. 5 (September/October 1998). 
Hastedt, Glenn P. "Models of Policy Making: Overview." In American Foreign Policy: 
Past, Present, and Future. Third ed. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1997. 
Hersh, Seymour M. Selective Intelligence: Donald Rumsfeld has his own special sources. 
Are they reliable? The New Yorker, 12 May 2003.  
Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review. Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review. 
Washington, DC: Office of the White House Press Secretary, 2007.  
Jervis, Robert. "Hypotheses on Misperception." World Politics 20, no. 3 (April 1968). 
Kaufman, Stephen. "Rice Appoints Assistance Coordinator as Part of U.S. Iraq Plan." 
U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Information Programs. 
http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-
english&y=2007&m=January&x=20070111130733esnamfuak0.1400873 (accessed 
11 January 2007). 
Kelemen, Michele. "Reconstruction Teams at Premium in Iraq." National Public Radio. 






Landay, Jonathan S. and Warren P. Strobel. "Military Unready for Iraqi Response; 
Welcome Expected, Officials Say Extensive Plans Said to be Undeveloped for 
Current Occupation, Security Threats." The Charlotte Observer, 12 July 2003a, sec. 
Main. 
Landay, Jonathon S. and Warren P. Strobel. "Pentagon Civilians' Lack of Planning 
Contributed to Chaos in Iraq." Knight Ridder/Tribune Information Services, 12 July 
2003b. 
Lebow, Richard N. "Cognitive Closure and Crisis Politics." In Between Peace and War: 
The Nature of International Crisis. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1981. 
Mann, James. Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet. New York: 
Viking Penguin, 2004. 
Marcella, Gabriel. "National Security and the Interagency Process." In U.S. Army War 
College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, edited by J. Boone 
Bartholomees. 1st ed., 239. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army 
War College, 2004, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=409 
(accessed 2 February 2007). 
Morgenthau, Hans J. "A Realist Theory of International Politics." In Politics among 
Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace Brief Edition, edited by Kenneth W. 
Thompson. 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985. 
Myers, Richard B. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A 
Strategy for Today; Vision for Tomorrow. Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 2004, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf (accessed 5 February 
2007).  
National Defense University Joint Forces Staff College. The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 
2000. Norfolk, VA: National Defense University Joint Forces Staff College, 2000, 
http://www.jfsc.ndu.edu/current_students/documents_policies/documents/jsogpub_1
_2000.pdf (accessed 20 February 2007). 
Neustadt, Richard E. "Leader Or Clerk." In Presidential Power. New York: The New 
American Library, 1964a. 
———. "The Power to Persuade." In Presidential Power. New York: The New 




Neustadt, Richard E. and Ernest R. May. "Preface." In Thinking in Time: The Uses of 
History for Decision-Makers. New York: The Free Press, 1986. 
Nuruzzaman, Mohammed. "Beyond the Realist Theories: "Neo-Conservative Realism" 
and the American Invasion of Iraq." International Studies Perspectives 7, no. 3 
(2006). 
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. Transforming Conflict 
Management. Washington, DC: United States Department of State, 2005, 
http://www.ndu.edu/ismo/docUploaded/Pascual.pdf (accessed 25 February 2007).  
———. Mission Statement. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2004, 
http://www.state.gov/s/crs/c12936.htm (accessed 10 February 2007).  
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A 
Challenging Road Ahead. Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, 2007, http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20070202_release.pdf 
(accessed 25 February 2007). 
Pace, Peter. The 16th Chairman's Guidance to the Joint Staff: Shaping the Future. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005, 
http://www.jcs.mil/PaceGuidance02Oct05.pdf (accessed 7 February 2007).  
Patterson, Charles. "Preparing for Post-Saddam Iraq: Plans and Actions." Cambridge, 
MA, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 27 October, 2004.  
Payne, Keith, B. "The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction." 
Comparative Strategy 22, no. 5 (December 2003). 
Perrow, Charles. "Managerial Ideologies." In Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, 
edited by Albert J. Reiss and Harold L. Wilensky. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman 
and Company, 1972a. 
———. "Why Bureaucracy?" In Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay, edited by 
Albert J. Reiss and Harold L. Wilensky. Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and 
Company, 1972b. 
———. "Perspectives on Organizations." In Organizational Analysis: A Sociological 
View. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1970. 
Phillips, David L. Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco. Boulder, CO: 




Powell, Colin L. Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2004 to 2009. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2003, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/24299.pdf (accessed 5 February 
2007).  
———. Future of Iraq Expert Working Groups. Washington, DC: United States 
Department of State, 2002, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB163/iraq-state-01.pdf (accessed 
25 February 2007).  
Pratt, Julius. "The Aims of Foreign Policy." In A History of United States Foreign Policy. 
2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1965. 
Ricks, Thomas E. Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. New York: The 
Penguin Press, 2006. 
———. "Army Historian Cites Lack of Postwar Plan." The Washington Post, 25 
December 2004, online, sec. World/Middle East/Gulf/Iraq, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A24891-2004Dec24?language=printer 
(accessed 7 September 2007). 
Rieff, David. "Blue Print for a Mess." The New York Times, 2 November 2003, online.  
Rose, David. Neo Culpa: Now they Tell Us. Vanity Fair, 3 November 2006. 
Rubin, Trudy. "Iraq Chaos a Result of Blinkered Arrogance." The Philadelphia Inquirer, 
27 June 2004, sec. Currents. 
Rumsfeld, Donald H. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2006, http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/ (accessed 10 
February 2007).  
———. The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf (accessed 5 
February 2007).  
Sapin, Burton M. "Some Fundamental Characteristics of the System." In The Making of 





Scarborough, Rowan. "U.S. Rushed Post-Saddam Planning." The Washington Times, 3 
September, 2003, online, sec. Nation/Politics, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryID=20030903-120317-
9393r (accessed 5 March 2007).  
Senior Administration Officials on New Strategy for Iraq. "Senior Administration 
Officials on New Strategy for Iraq: Briefing by State’s Condoleezza Rice, Defense’s 
Robert Gates, General Peter Pace." The White House Office of the Press Secretary. 
http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=texttrans-
english&y=2007&m=January&x=20070111114738eaifas0.4822199 (accessed 11 
January 2007). 
Shanker, Thom. "Pentagon to Fill Iraq Reconstruction Jobs Temporarily." The New York 
Times, 19 February 2007, online, sec. Middle East, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/20/world/middleeast/20military.html (accessed 20 
February 2007). 
Shanker, Thom and David S. Cloud. "U.S. Military Asking Other Agencies to Step Up in 
Iraq." International Herald Tribune, 7 February 2007, online, sec. 
Regions>Americas. 
Smith, Michael Joseph. "Hans Morgenthau: Power and the National Interest." In Realist 
Thought from Weber to Kissinger. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1986. 
Snyder, Richard C., H. W. Bruck, and Burton M. Sapin, eds. Foreign Policy Decision-
Making. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. 
Stahl, Leslie. Bush Sought 'Way' to Invade Iraq. 60 Minutes, 11 January 2004a.  
———. Clarke's Take on Terror. 60 Minutes, 21 March 2004b.  
Suskind, Ron. The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the 
Education of Paul O'Neill. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004.  
Thielmann, Greg, “Truth, War, & Consequences,” interview by Martin Smith, Frontline 
(9 October 2003), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/truth/interviews/thielmann.html 
(accessed 15 October 2007). 
United States Department of State. Authorization for use of Military Force Against Iraq 
Resolution of 2002. Washington, DC: United States Department of State, 2003, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB163/iraq-state-05.pdf (accessed 




———. Iraq Contingency Planning. Washington, DC: United States Department of 
State, 2003, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB163/iraq-state-
03.pdf (accessed 21 February 2007).  
Van Evera, Stephen. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1997. 
Walker, David M. Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for 
Congressional Oversight. Washington, DC: United States Government 
Accountability Office, 2007, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07308sp.pdf (accessed 
3 March 2007).  
———. Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help 
Achieve U.S. Goals and Overcome Challenges. Washington, DC: United States 
Government Accountability Office, 2006, 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06953t.pdf (accessed 5 March 2007).  
Welch, David A. "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: 
Retrospect and Prospect." International Security 17, no. 2 (Autumn 1992). 
Whittaker, Alan G., Frederick C. Smith, and Elizabeth McKune. The National Security 
Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System. Washington, D.C.: 
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2007. 
Woodward, Bob. State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III. New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2006. 
———. Plan of Attack: The Definitive Account of the Decision to Invade Iraq. New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2004. 
Wright, Robin. "White House Divided Over Reconstruction." Los Angeles Times, 2 April 
2003, Home, sec. War with Iraq/Policy. 
Zegart, Amy B. "Introduction." In Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and 


















INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
 
 
 
 
